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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the development of laws governing
limitation of shipowner liability to cargo owners from the
Harter Act to the Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA). The inadequacy of the $500 per package
limitation of liability as protection to shippers is illus-
trated through the use of case studies by comparing the
application of this provision to break-bulk shipments when
COGSA was first passed to its application today in the age of
containerization.
The efforts of the major maritime nations to revise the
Hague Rules/COGSA system in the Visby Amendments are examined
and compared to the new regime proposed by cargo interests
from developing nations in the United Nations Convention of
the Carriage of Goods by Sea. Although the Visby Amendments
provide some benefits to shippers over the Hague Rules,
uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of clauses
pertaining to containerized cargo have prevented the United
States from adopting them. While the Hamburg Rules offer
shippers better protection, they have not been accepted by
any major maritime nations primarily because of opposition
from carriers.
Finally, the new bill on shipowner liability being con-
sidered by Congress is examined and an alternative approach
to determining shipowner liability is proposed.
ii
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Introduction
1
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, contains a
provision that limits shipowner liability for cargo damage to
2
$500 per package or per customary freight unit. The objec-
tives of this thesis are first, to expose the obsolescence
and inadequacy of this provision as protection to the shipper
for losses of cargo shipped on ocean common carriers, and
second, to show how U.S. legislation regarding shipowner
liability with respect to cargo has not evolved with inter-
national maritime law concerning the same issue.
Recognizing the need to regulate the use of ocean bills
of lading by common carriers, Congress passed the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) in 1936. This act was the American
version of the rules formulated by the International Maritime
3
Committee (CMI) in 1921 and adopted as the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, signed at Brussels in 1924 (Hague Rules). The
United States became party to the Brussels Convention in 1937
with the understanding that where there was a discrepancy
4
between the two, COGSA would supercede the Hague Rules.
Three factors have made the $500 per package provision
obsolete today. The most obvious is that due to inflation,
$500 no longer covers the percentage of the value of cargo that
it did in 1936. Another factor is that with the development of
high technology industries the inherent value of manufactured
goods shipped today is far greater than the value of goods
1
shipped prior to the second world war. The most critical
factor is the development of containerization as the most
common method of transporting manufactured goods. In the con-
text of containerization, the term "package" has become
ambiguous; it could have a wide range of meanings and has even
been equated with the term "container" in some court decisions.
To appreciate the potential unfairness of this provision today,
one need only consider the impact on the owner of a lost con-
tainer of personal computers if the carrier is allowed to limit
his liability to $500 for the container.
Because of the unfairness of the low limitation of
liability and the constant need to define "package" as it
pertains to containerized cargo, the international shipping
community amended the Hague Rules in the 1968 and 1979
Protocols of the Brussels Convention (the Visby Amendments).
The result of the 1968 amendment was an increase in the
limitation of shipowner liability to 10,000 poincare francs
5 6
($663) per package or 30 poincare francs ($0.90) per kilo,
whichever was higher. The system was changed again in the 1979
7
Protocol to 667 special drawing rights (SDR) per package or 2
SDRs per kilo. In 1981, this equaled $755 per package or $2.26
8
per kilo. These amendments are in effect but have not been
adopted by the United States.
Many shippers (cargo owners), especially those from
9
developing countries, still felt that there was a need to
change the law to offer more protection to the shipper,
2
particularly when operating under COGSA with United States
carriers and suing for damages in U. S. courts without the
benefit of the Visby Amendments. In the 19708, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
became involved in the effort to revise dramatically the
conditions of carrier liability on an international level. The
result was the formulation of the Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg Rules).
The Hamburg Rules incorporate several changes to the
Hague Rules and Visby Amendments that are meant to provide a
superior level of protection to the shipper. Under these rules
the burden of proof is on the carrier to show that he took all
10
measures reasonably required to avoid damage to the cargo.
These rules expunge the seventeen exceptions to liability found
in COGSA/Hague Rules and increase the level of shipowner
1 1
liability to 2.5 SDRs per kilo or 835 SDRs per package.
Although these rules are gaining some acceptance within the
international shipping community, the United States has not yet
adopted them.
This problem was selected for study for two reasons. The
first is simply that the law is no longer reasonable; the ocean
common carrier can limit his liability to a very low percentage
of the value of the cargo while other common carriers (truck
12
and rail) are virtual insurers of the cargo. The second
reason that this problem was selected is that the House Commit-
3
tee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries is considering a new
13
bill that will amend this law to make it conform more to
international standards and to take into account the develop-
ments in shipping that have made the original provision
inadequate. The time is appropriate, therefore, to analyze
this issue in detail, not only with respect to U.S. shippers
and carriers but also in an international context, to show how
the entire shipping community has attempted to treat this
problem.
This thesis contains five sections. The first section
analyzes the legislative history of the Hague Rules and COGSA.
Section two examines court decisions involving the per package
limitation shortly after the law was passed and section three
contains recent decisions concerning large pieces of
machinery and cargo shipped in containers. Section four
examines the Visby Amendments, the Hamburg Rules, and the new
bill introduced by the House Committee on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries as they apply to shipowner liability with
respect to cargo. Section five contains general conclusions
and recommendations. This section summarizes the material
previously presented and proposes an alternative method for
establishing the extent of shipowner liability that does not
set specific dollar values as the limit of liability and does
not require a definition of the term "package" as it applies
to unitized cargo.
4
Chapter One: Legislative History of the Hague Rules and COGSA
At common law and prior to the passage of any legislation
governing the responsibilities of shipowners to cargo owners,
the carrier had the absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel
and was strictly liable for any cargo damage except under a few
conditions; the carrier was not liable for losses resulting
from an act of God, an act of the public enemy, the fault of
the shipper, or an inherent vice in the nature of the goods.
The carrier could escape liability under those exceptions only
if he had exercised reasonable care in the custody of the
14 15
cargo. In 1851, passage of the "Fire Statute" added fire
as one of the recognized exceptions to liability provided that
the fire had not been the result of shipowner design or neg-
lect. In addition, the carrier could exonerate himself from
liability for damage caused by other means, but only through
contract -- by stipulating the conditions in the bill of
lading.
Problems arose when carriers took advantage of their
superior bargaining position over shippers and began abusing
their contractual rights; carriers wrote clauses into bills of
lading relieving themselves of liability for cargo damage
16
resulting from every imaginable cause. To correct this
17
situation, Congress in 1893 passed the Harter Act,
legislation designed to improve the shipper's position in
5
securing protection for his cargo. Under the Harter Act,
carriers were not allowed to write any clauses into the bill of
lading that would relieve them of liability for damage caused
18
by negligence in the care and custody of the cargo. To
appease the carriers, Congress absolved the carriers of the
absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel by including a
provision stating that they need only exercise due diligence to
19
make the vessel seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage. In
addition, Congress added a clause stating that if the carrier-
had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, he
could escape liability for damage caused by errors in navi-
gation or management of the vessel and for damage resulting
from an attempt to save property or life at sea, as well as for
the traditional causes -- acts of God or the public enemy, an
inherent vice in the nature of the goods, or the fault of the
20
shipper.
The Harter Act had three major faults; the first was that
the shipper had the onus of proving that the carrier had not
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. This
placed an unfair burden on the shipper, who usually had little
chance of obtaining the evidence necessary to prove the car-
rier's negligence. In this way, carriers frequently escaped
liability even when they had not fulfilled their obligation to
21
exercise due diligence. The second fault was that although
the carriers could not exonerate themselves'from liability for
reasons other than those stipulated under section 192, the
6
carrier was free to limit his liability to very low values. A
valuation as low as $100 per package was frequently accepted by
the courts as a reasonable limitation of shipowner liability to
22
cargo. With these two "escape routes" available to ship-
owners, shippers could not obtain sufficient protection against
losses. Despite these advantages, the carriers were not
satisfied with the Harter Act either. Their dissatisfaction
lay in the third fault of the legislation: if the shipper could
prove that the carrier had not exercised due diligence, the
carrier could not escape liability even if he could show that
the damage had been caused by one of the exceptions to
23
liability stipulated in section 192.
Conflicts that arose as a result of these three
deficiences of the Harter Act, and the lack of uniformity of
laws governing bill of lading use worldwide, led to a series of
conferences held in the early 1900s in London and at the Hague
under the auspices of the Imperial Shipping Committee and the
International Maritime Committee. The result of these
meetings, as ment ioned earlier, was the formulation of the
Hague Rules governing the use of ocean bills of lading. In
September 1921, the International Law Association adopted the
rules at a conference held at the Hague, and encouraged the
international shipping community to abide by them.
The Hague Rules, like the Harter Act, were a compromise
between two opposing interests -- the shipowners on one side
who wanted to avoid liability for cargo damage whenever pos-
7
sible, and the cargo owners and insurers on the other side who
wanted to receive adequate compensation for their losses. The
new rules incorporated many of the provisions of the Harter
Act; however, modifications were made to correct the
deficiences discussed earlier. The carriers insisted on a rule
that would allow them to avoid liability for damage caused by
unseaworthiness as long as they had exercised due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage. This
24
provision was designed to prevent situations in which ship-
owners could be held liable for damage because "a loose rivet
in the deck, or a crack in a hatch cover, or one less mess boy
25
than required" indicated a lack of due diligence but were
unrelated to the cause of damage.
To get this provision, shipowners made several conces-
sions to the shippers. The first was that the carriers ac-
cepted the burden of proving that they had exercised due dili-
gence before they could claim exemption from liability under
26
one of the exceptions. This corrected the problem in the
Harter Act in which shippers had to prove negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to receive compensation for their
losses. A second significant concession to the shippers was
the acceptance by the carriers of the £100 per package
27
limitation of liability ($500 per package under COGSA).
Shipowners at the Hague conference agreed to this demand only
because they felt that the success of the conference depended
on it. In his address to the International Shipping Conference
8
held in London in Nov. 1921, Sir Norman Hill, representative of
the Liverpool Steamship Owner's Association, stated:
The point is one which was pressed with the greatest
persistence by the Cargo Interests. At the Hague we
challenged the reasonableness of the amount. We
sought to base it on the freight and offered to agree
to a limit fixed at even twenty times the freight.
But all our offers were refused.28
When asked by the representative of the Japanese Shipowners'
Association why they had accepted the £100 per package
limitation, Hill replied:
I can only say that we did our utmost at the Hague to
get a lower limit, and what we thought was a more
reasonable limit, and we failed. • We fought it
right up to the very end, and I think every represen-
tative of the shipowners who met at the Hague and was
there following the arguments, knew that it was a
case of either taking the £100, or having done with
the whole thing. • I think myself the figure is
too high. I think the cargo owners have made a
mistake in asking for it, but we could not have
carried the Rules without.29
Despite the dissatisfaction with the £100 per package
prov ision, this conference, representing shipowners from all of
the major maritime nations, passed a resolution recommending
the adoption of the Hague Rules:
That this Conference, .which has had before it
the "Hague Rules, 1921" recently adopted by the
International Law Association for submission to the
various interests concerned in Bills of Lading, is of
the opinion that the interests of trade and commerce
are best served by full freedom of contract, unfet-
tered by State Control. But that in view of the
almost unanimous desire manifested by merchants,
bankers, and underwriters for the adoption of the
Hague Rules this Conference is prepared to recommend
them for voluntary international application, and if
and so far as may be necessary for adoption by Inter-
national Convention between Maritime Countries, Italy
and Japan reserving the right to raise questions on
the Rule which prohibits the shipowner fixing a limit
9
30
of liability below £100 per package.
After submission to the International Diplomatic Conference on
Maritime Law at Brussels, the Convention was signed on 24
31
August 1924 by all of the participating nations, including
the United States. Despite the recommendations by the American
delegates to the Convention, and support from the United States
32
Shipping Board, the United States did not become party to the
Convention until 1937, and then only with the understanding
that where there was a discrepancy between COGSA and the Con-
vention, COGSA would prevail.
Several attempts were made to amend the Harter Act in the
1920s, including a bill incorporating the Hague Rules intro-
33
duced to Congress by Senator Borah in 1927 after hearings
were held on the Brussels Convention before a subcommittee on
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. No action
was taken on either the bill or the Convention and a similar
bill was submitted in March 1928 by M~. White, Chairman of the
34
House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries. This
35
bill was re-submitted in June 1929 and hearings were held
again in March 1930.
The first part of this bill was essentially identical to
the Brussels Convention, but Title II contained several changes
that were meant to make the new rules more compatible with
36
American shipping practices. This bill became the subject of
the Conference on Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading conducted by
the national Chamber of Commerce in November 1930 and attended
10
by numerous trade associations. The participants at this con-
ference recommended several changes before they would support
37
passage of the bill. Although the Senate had already
approved the Brussels Convention, the Conference in 1935 sent a
letter to the State Department urging that it stop the
ratification process until Congress had passed the domestic
38
legislation containing their proposed amendments. The
Conference suggested that only then should the Convention be
ratified, subject to the reservations containing their proposed
39
changes. It was this amended bill, S.1152, that was the
subject of hearings held before the Senate Committee on
Commerce in 1935 and the House Committee on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries in 1936.
The $500 per package provision was not one of the major
issues discussed during the Senate hearings, but it was ad-
dressed several times during the House hearings. When
explaining the benefits of S.1152 to the Chairman of the
hearings, A. B. Barber, manager of the Transportation and
Communication Department of Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, stated:
The bill (sec. 4, par. 5) prohibits the carrier
from limiting his liability below $500 per package or
customary freight unit, with the parties free to
agree upon a higher figure if they wish, but not upon
a lower figure.
That does not mean they will get $500 for every
package, but they will get the value, if it is within
$500, and they may agree to take a higher limit; but
the shipowner may not put in his bill of lading a
proviso that the limit shall be lower than $500, or
the actual value of the goods, if less than that
amount.40
11
When the chairman asked if the carrier was entitled to write
such clauses into his bill of lading under the Harter Act,
Barber responded:
Yes. • and that is very commonly done and it is
very difficult for a shipper to search out, through
all of these different bills of lading, and find out
just what the provisions are. Sometimes they are in
very fine type. So this is one of the principal
reasons the shippers believe this is a good
measure.41
In later testimony, Charles Haight, Chairman of the Bills
of Lading Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce,
spelled out the advantages for the shipper in the new bill:
• the shippers are today, in The Hague rules,
and in this bill. • getting more advantage than
anybody else affected by it. • They get a tremen-
dous advantage in raising the limit per package to
$500. That is far above the average value per pac-
kage. The steamship owners at The Hague con-
ference said,"You ought to fiX, first, our right to
limit liability to the value of the average package",
and the cargo representatives practically said,
"Unless you give us $500 per package as that limit,
we are going to bolt the conference." It was a
complete and absolute defi and the owners, in order
to try and get. • international uniformity and
stop this ridiculous situation, under which every
country in the world has a different law, suc-
cumbed.42
It is clear, then, that at this time, the $500 per pac-
kage limitation was demanded by shippers, was expected to cover
the value of most cargo shipped in packages, and was high
enough that most shippers would be completely reimbursed for
damage caused by negligence without having to rely on cargo
insurance for total compensation. The shipowners strongly
opposed this provision and agreed to it only because they felt
that uniformity was important and, further, that they would be
12
able to escape liability for unseaworthiness unless they were
negligent. These latter considerations outweighed their ob-
jection to the $500 per package limitation. Passage of COGSA
and ratification of the Brussels Convention by the United
States accomplished two things: it created a situation in which
every major maritime nation operated under a uniform legal
framework that provided a fair distribution of the risks of
ocean cargo carriage between shippers and carriers and it
clarified the rights and responsibilities of both parties
enough so that for many years, litigation for cargo claims was
significantly reduced.
13
Chapter Two: Case Law and the Per Package Limitation
for Break-bulk Cargoes
Although the per package limitation of liability today
causes numerous problems for shippers and carriers, it was
originally a clear and reasonable means of establishing the
level of the carrier's liability to shippers. It became
popular with carriers after the passage of the Harter Act,
which prevented carriers from including clauses in their
bills of lading that would exonerate them from liability for
causes other than those stipulated in the act. A statutory
provision incorporating this method of establishing liability
received support from shippers as well during the formulation
of the Hague Rules, as long as the limit was sufficiently
high to cover the value of most cargo.
When Congress held hearings on the Hague Rules and cor-
responding U.S. legislation, the term "package" was never
defined, nor was a definition included in the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act. The most likely reason for this is that the
meaning of the term was obvious; the most common cargoes were
shipped in small units that easily conformed to the term "pac-
43
kage." The first part of this chapter contains a brief look
at court cases involving cargo claims from the late 1920s
through the 1950s that provide some concrete evidence as to how
the per package limitation was first used. In these cases the
question of what was the package was not at issue since what
constituted the "package" in the bill of lading was clear to
14
the shipper and carrier, as well as to the court. These cases
do, however, offer some insight as to how various sorts of
general cargo were shipped prior to containerization, the ap-
proximate value of typical packages, under what conditions the
carrier was allowed to limit his liability, and under what
conditions the carrier forfeited his right to limit. As these
cases will show, the use of the per package limitation, either
as a value written into the bill of lading under the Harter Act
or as the statutory limit under COGSA, generally produced
equitable and predictable results in which the distribution of
the risks of ocean cargo transport was clearly defined.
A. Cases in which the carrier forfeited his right to limit
after failing to offer the shipper an opportunity to
declare a higher value.
Under the Harter Act, the courts upheld the per package
limitation written into the bill of lading only if the carrier
had offered the shipper the opportunity to declare a higher
value for the cargo and pay a higher, or ad valorum, rate to
increase the carrier's liability to cover the full value of the
cargo. If the carrier failed to offer a choice of rates, he
forfeited his right to limit and was fully liable for the
damages. Examples of this can be found in the 1927 case of the
44
Shinyo Maru, in which the carrier was found liable for the
f~ll value of a damaged shipment of arsenic acid, in the 1926
case of Lawrence Leather Co. v. Compagnie General Trans-
45
atlantigue, where the shipper recovered the full value of 332
15
cases of furs that had disappeared, and in ~ ~ Strauss! CO.
46
v. Canadian Pacific Railroad, in which the shipper was
completely compensated for the value of three bales of silk
stolen while in the custody of the carrier. In all of these
cases, the bills of lading contained package limitations less
than the value of the lost cargoes, but the carriers were not
allowed to limit their liability because of their failure to
offer the shippers higher rates to increase carrier liability.
B. Cases in which carriers were allowed to limit because
shippers failed to declare a higher value for the cargo.
The carrier's practice of charging ~ valorum rates when
shippers declared the value of their cargo in the bill of
lading was not specifically authorized by the Hague Rules or
COGSA; however, the practice persisted anyway when the new
rules went into effect and the courts continued to view it as a
legitimate means of increasing the carrier's liability above
the $500 per package limitation. In cases where the shipper
clearly had the opportunity to declare a higher value and pay
an ~ valorum rate but neglected to do so to save on the
freight, the courts upheld the per package limitation even when
it resulted in significant losses to the shipper. This was
47
true in the Harter Act case of The Emden, in which the car-
rier was allowed to limit his liability to $400 for four lost
cases of musical instruments worth $1600, and in the 1940 COGSA
48
case of Shackman et al v. Cunard White Star, where the ship-
16
per recovered only $1000 for the loss of two cases of furs
valued at more than $18,000.
C. Cases in which carriers forfeited the right to limit their
liability when an unreasonable deviation caused cargo
damage.
Another hold-over from the Harter Act era was the
practice of forcing the carrier to forfeit his right to limit
when an unreasonable deviation was the cause of cargo loss or
49
damage. Although the Hague Rules and COGSA state that a
deviation to save life or property at sea may not be considered
unreasonable, the courts have been left with the task of deter-
mining what does constitute an unreasonable deviation. The
most prevalent early examples of unreasonable deviation
involved cargo that was damaged because it had been shipped on
deck, exposed to the elements, when below deck stowage or some
other protection had been required. In the 1939 case of
50
Pioneer Imports v. The Lafcomo, the shipper recovered the
full value ($56,970) of a shipment of flower pips ruined by
exposure to seawater even though the bill of lading limited his
liability to $25 per cubic foot because the carrier failed to
stow and cover them in the manner stipulated in the contract of
carriage.
51
In a later case, Jones v. The Flying Clipper tried in
1953, the court awarded the shipper a recovery of more than
$2000 per package for damage to a shipment of automobile parts
17
because the carrier had stowed the crates on deck when below
deck stowage was clearly indicated. The court's reasoning for
their decision was that allowing carriers to limit their
liability for damage caused by an unreasonable deviation would
encourage them to ignore their obligations to shippers and
would be tantamount to condoning their wilful misconduct.
Although the $500 per package limitation seems painfully
low today, it did in fact fully compensate shippers of most
cargoes through the 1950s. In the 1954 case of Teneria ~ Popo
52
v. Home Insurance Co., the $500 per package limitation easily
covered the value of a shipment of furs damaged by a beetle
infestation caused by carrier negligence. The limitation was
significant enough that until recently, carriers employed in-
novative methods, such as trying to pro-rate payment for
partial damage to cargo, in order to escape paying out the full
$500. Pro-rating of damages was invalidated by the court in
the 1940 case of Pan-Am Trade and Credit Corp. ~ al v. The
Campfire as a clear attempt to negate the purpose of COGSA,
which was to motivate carriers to care properly for the cargo
by preventing them from limiting their liability below $500 per
package.
In all of these cases, what consituted the "package" was
clear; bales of fur or silk, boxes of musical instruments,
crates of car parts, and boxes of flower rootstocks were all
considered packages for the purposes of determining shipowner
liability. The court's task in these cases was first, to
18
decide if the carrier was liable for damage at all, and second,
to determine when and to what extent liability could be
limited. The definition of the term "package" was not always
54
so clear, however. In Stirnimann v. The San Diego, the court
had to decide if individual unboxed pieces of a crane were
packages covered by the $500 limit or if the carrier was
entitled to limit his liability to $500 for the whole crane.
Even though freight had been paid as a lump sum for the entire
crane, the court found that each piece of the crane constituted
a package covered by the $500 limit.
Except in one case discussed above, where the value of
two packages of furs was greater than $18,000, the $500 limit
provided a very significant level of protection to the shipper,
usually covering the entire value of cargo shipped as packages.
The courts made their decisions under the presumption that the
$500 per package limitation was meant to benefit the shipper
and act as a motivating force for the carrier to care for the
cargo. Any clause that the carrier included in his bill of
lading to limit liability below that amount, any deviation from
the expected method of transportation, or any attempt to
prevent the shipper from declaring a higher value resulted in
the carrier forfeiting his right to limit his liability. In
cases where the shipper had the opportunity to declare a higher
value but failed to do so to save on the freight, the courts
upheld the limit, either in the bill of lading or under COGSA.
In the one case where the cargo was not shipped as traditional
19
"packages", the court treated each piece of cargo as a COGSA
package protected by the $500 limit instead of allowing the
carrier to limit liability based on the freight unit, which
would have come to a lesser amount.
In summary, the $500 per package limitation for many
years produced the results that were originally intended; it
allowed most cargo owners to ship at the normal rate and
receive substantial protection, it encouraged shippers of very
high valued goods to pay for increased carrier liability, and
it provided a significant motivation to carriers to protect the
cargo and abide by the terms of the bill of lading.
This situation began to change in the late 1950s when
large pieces of machinery were shipped more frequently and in
the late 1960s when containerization of cargo became popular.
In cases involving large pieces of machinery, the most pressing
problem for the courts has been deciding under what conditions
the machinery should be treated as a single package, and when
liability should be based on the customary freight unit
instead. The only clear result of these decision so far is
that the outcome essentially depends on who hears the case
rather than on the sound principle that the package limitation
is intended to benefit the shipper, not the carrier.
The same situation exists in container cases, where the
question facing the court is whether a 40' x S'x S' metal
55
box, designed by shipping companies to facilitate the
handling of large amounts of cargo at one time and reduce
20
time spent in port, containing assorted cargoes, some pac-
kaged within the container, some simply stowed inside, should
be treated as a single package or whether the individual
items within the container are the packages. Common sense
clearly dictates that a carrier should never be allowed to
limit his liability to $500 for an entire container full of
cargo because such a result would pervert the purpose of
COGS A by reducing a shipper's protection to a negligible
amount. Unfortunately, as the following container cases will
show, the courts have not always been guided by common sense
and an understanding of the purpose of COGSA, but have become
embroiled in efforts to create elaborate tests to determine
when the container is a COGSA package and when it is not.
The decisions in these more recent cases indicate that
the $500 per package limitation has lost its predictability and
has become a disaster for cargo interests while providing
carriers with the excellent opportunity to escape liability for
damage caused by their negligence now when $500 covers only a
small fraction of the value of cargo shipped in containers or
as single large units.
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Chapter Three: Recent Applications of the $500 Limit
The absence of a definition of the term "package" in
COGSA has begun to pose significant problems for courts faced
with the task of determining liability for damage to single
large pieces of cargo that do not look like typical break-bulk
packages. This section presents three cases in which the
courts reached vastly different conclusions concerning
liability for damage to similar types of cargoes.
Part One: Large Pieces of Machinery: Are They COGSA Packages?
In cases involving large pieces of machinery, one appeals
court insisted on treating the cargo as a COGSA package simply
because skids (a wooden base supporting the machinery) were
used to aid in handling the cargo. Another appeals court felt
that the absence of a skid disqualified the cargo as a package
and required that liability be based on the customary freight
unit instead, while a third appeals court discounted any
importance of the skid at all, and based its decision on the
presumption that the limit based on the customary freight unit
was included in COGSA specifically for these types of cargo to
guarantee protection to the shipper of unpackaged goods. This
sampling of cases involving large pieces of machinery is meant
to show the variety of opinions held by different courts and
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that so far, no conclusive decision has been reached as to how
this class of cargo should be treated under COGSA.
A. Machinery not on skids is not a COGSA package.
In 1953, the second circuit affirmed a district court
decision that a tractor with some parts covered by waterproof
paper and partially encased with wooden planking was not a
COGSA package, primarily because the tractor was resting on its
own treads rather than on skids. In Gulf Italia v. American
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Export Lines the court decided that the carrier's liability
for damage caused by his negligence should be determined based
on $500 per customary freight unit, bringing recovery to
57
$17,300.
The majority opinion here agreed with the district court
that Congress had not intended to allow carriers to limit their
liability for damage caused by their negligence to a mere
"pittance of $500" by calling this tractor a package when
liability based on the freight rate provided a far more
equitable result for the shipper.
B. Machinery on skids is a COGSA package.
A toggle press weighing more than three tons, bolted to a
skid but not otherwise packaged, was a COGSA package in
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Aluminios Pozuelo v. ~ ~ Navigator in 1968. The court
based its decision primarily on the definition of the term
23
"package" in Black's Law Dictionary:
The skid attached to the toggle press shipped by
Aluminios, while to some extent protecting the
machine, served primariliy to facilitate delivery so
as to make the press an article "put up * * * in a
form suitable for transportation or handling."59
The court felt that because the skid was attached to fac ilitate
handling, the press should be treated as a package, limiting
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liability to $500 for $3754 in damages.
It appears that this court, by stretching the term "pac-
kage" to include a large piece of machinery simply because it
was attached to a skid, has chosen to ignore the original
purpose of the $500 per package provision in COGSA, which was
to provide a high level of protection to the shipper even when
cargo is shipped at the normal rate. Congress included an
alternative approach for cargo not shipped as traditional pac-
kages, liability based on the customary freight unit, that was
meant to be used when it better fulfilled the original intent
of the act. A decision based on the quesitonable importance of
the presence of skids does little to distribute the risks of
ocean transport in an equitable and predictable manner.
C. Machinery on skids is not a COGSA package.
In 1974, the ninth circuit decided in Hartford Fire
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Insurance Co. v. Pac ific Far East Line, Inc. that a damaged
electrical transformer weighing 37,000 pounds attached to a
skid but not otherwise boxed was not a COGSA package. Keeping
the legislative intent of COGS A in mind, the court concluded
24
that the writers of COGSA included the $500 limit based on the
freight unit to provide a comparable level of protection to the
62
shipper of unpackaged cargo.
In addition, the court felt that it was obligated to use
the ordinary meaning of the term "package" since Congress did
not include a definition of the term in COGSA, and that techno-
logical advances in the shipping industry do not justify the
"over-extension of the statutory term." This court was
unwilling to allow the arbitrary factor of having a skid
attached to influence their determination of the carrier's
liability when a far more equitable result could be obtained by
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using the freight unit as the basis for liability.
One result of these three cases is clear: any shipper of
large pieces of machinery would be well advised not to attach
the machinery to skids, nor try to protect the cargo further by
covering parts of it with wood or paper if any dispute would be
settled by the second circuit, where decisions are freqently
made with the carrier's best interests in mind. The cargo
owner who ships out of west coast ports, however, can ap-
parently go to the extra trouble of protecting his cargo by
covering it or placing it on skids because damages will be
awarded under the assumption that COGSA was designed chiefly to
protect his interests.
Unfortunately, this same inconsistency surrounds cases
involving cargo shipped in containers. The methods for deter-
mining whether the container should be treated as a package
have evolved significantly over the last 15 years but the most
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recent trend has been not to consider the container a package
when the bill of lading discloses the contents of the
container. Even this relatively predictable means of esta-
blishing carrier liability was abandoned by the second circuit
this year in a decision that promises to have profound
deleterious effects on shippers in the future unless the law is
amended.
Part Two: Containerization and the Per Package Limitation
The introduction of containerization for the purposes of
consolidating large amounts of cargo into a single unit has
brought significant benefits to both carriers and shippers.
For carriers, containerization has drastically reduced the
amount of time necessary for vessels to spend in port by the
mechanization of cargo handling, thus reducing stevedoring
costs as well. It has also enabled shipping companies to build
much larger vessels and use more space on board for stowing
cargo, providing carriers with the opportunity to increase
their profits on each voyage.
Shippers have benefitted from containerization as well.
By loading containers themselves, shippers can ensure that
their cargo is adequately protected against damage while the
added protection of the metal walls of containers has reduced
the amount of packaging required for individual pieces of
cargo. In addition, containerization has reduced the incidence
of pilferage, which was so common in break-bulk shipments.
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Containerization has produced its share of problems,
however. Included in these is the need to define "package" as
it pertains to containerized cargo. As containers reduced the
need for extensive packaging of cargo, the meaning of the term
"package" lost the clarity it had in break-bulk shipments.
Accordingly, application of the per package limitation no
longer produces the predictable results it once did and
frequently violates the original purposes of the provision. As
the following container cases will show, the courts have
generally failed to let the past usage of the per package
limitation serve as a guide for establishing liability for
containerized cargo, with the result that the shipper is no
longer guaranteed protection under section 4(5) of COGS!.
A. Container is a package when the bill of lading does not
disclose the contents.
The 1972 decision in Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmer-
64 - -
land held that the container is a COGSA package when the bill
of lading does not describe the contents. In this case, 350
cartons of adding machines were loaded into a container, which
was stolen "from the terminal after it was discharged from the
ship in New York. The trial court decided that the container
was a COGSA package and awarded the shipper $500 for a loss of
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$29,400.
On affirming this decision Judge Oaks introduced the
"functional economics test" for deciding whether the container
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should be the COGSA package. This test involved determining
if the packages as stowed in the container could have been
shipped overseas without further packaging. He asserted the
"where the shipper's own packing units are functional, a pre-
sumption is created that a container is not a 'package' which
must be overcome by evidence supplied by the carrier that the
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parties intended to treat it as such." The court found that
because these machines could not have been shipped break-bulk
in the flimsy cartons in which they were stowed in the
container, the burden of proof shifted to the shipper to show
why the container should not be considered the package. Since
the bill of lading described the number of packages as one
container said to contain machinery, the court felt that the
shipper failed to show why the container should not have been
the package and limited recovery to $500.
This case shows that this "test" was particularly harsh
on the shipper who attempted to avail himself of the benefits
of the container by avoiding the extensive packaging that was
necessary to protect cargo shipped break-bulk. Applying this
test, only the shipper who went to the needless expense of
packaging his cargo excessively was able to obtain the
protection under COGSA to which he was legitimately entitled.
Unfortunately, the courts failed to appreciate the
ramifications of this test until much later and continued to
consider it a valid way of determining if the carrier was
liable for more than $500 for the entire container.
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B. Lift on/ lift off tanks carrying liquid are not COGSA
packages even when the bill of lading lists them as such.
In 1974 the second circuit reversed a decision that 11
lift on/ lift off (LO/LO) tanks each containing 2000 gallons of
damaged liquid latex were packages under COGSA. In Shinko
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Boeki~ Ltd. v. ~ ~ Pioneer Moon the appeals court
considered three possible ways that the latex could have been
shipped. The first would have been break-bulk in 55 gallon
drums. In this type of shipment, each drum would obviously
have been a COGSA package and liability would have been
$200,000 for the entire shipment. A second method would have
been as bulk cargo in deep tanks of a tanker. With this
method, liability would have been assessed per customary
freight unit ($500 per long ton). This would have brought
liability to $37,000 for damages totalling $27,733.75. If,
however, the LO/LO tanks were considered COGSA packages,
liability would have been limited to $5500, approximately one-
fifth the value of the cargo lost.
The court decided that the tanks should be thought of as
"smaller, movable versions" of the deep tanks in the vessel,
noting that the tanks belonged to the carrier and were re-used
voyage after voyage. With these factors in mind, the court
determined that the only logical method of establishing
liability would be by the customary freight unit, allowing the
shipper to be completely compensated for his losses.
This case brings out an important point; even in 1974,
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the per package limitation when applied to a break-bulk ship-
ment still provided more that adequate protection to the ship-
per. Once the court started to treat containers (or LO/LO
tanks) as packages, however, protection droppped to an almost
negligible amount. If the courts made their decisions under
the assumption that the purpose of COGSA was to ensure that
carriers would be held responsible for most damage caused by
their negligence even when cargo was shipped at the normal
rate, they would not be able to justify treating containers as
COGSA packages. This court could not accept the result in
which the shipper would lose most of his protection simply
because he employed a different technology for shipping his
cargo. Instead, the court made its decision with the shipper's
interests in mind, acknowledging that treating containers as
packages would lead to certainty, but that "'certainty at the
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expense of legislative policy and equity is undesirable. '"
C. Container is not a COGSA package when the bill of lading
discloses the contents.
In 1971, one of the first container cases produced a
landmark decision that held that when the contents of the
container are described in the bill of lading, the individual
contents, not the container, constitute packages under COGSA.
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In Leather's Best, Inc. v. ~ ~ Mormaclynx a container of
leather worth $49,500 was stolen from the container terminal
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after being discharged from the vessel. Concerning its
30
decision that each bale, not the entire container, was a pac-
kage, the court stated:
• we cannot escape the belief tnat the purpose
of [sec.] 4(5) of COGSA was to set a reasonable
figure below which the carrier should not be
permitted to limit his liability and the "package" is
thus more sensibly related to the unit in which the
shipper packed the goods and described them than a
large metal object, functionally a part of the ship
in which the carrier caused them to be "contained."71
[citations omitted]
The court struck down a clause in the bill of lading limiting
shipowner liability to $500 per container because it
attempted to limit liability below $500 per package.
The decision in Leather's Best formed the basis for
several others concerning containerized cargo (including the
decision in Shinko Boeki). In 1972, the second circuit af-
firmed another decision that the contents of the container, not
a container
the entire container, constituted COGSA packages.
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de Nemours International v. ~ ~ Mormacvega
In du Pont
stowed on deck loaded with 38 pallets of resin in packages was
washed overboard during transit. The court awarded the shipper
$19,000 in damages, $500 for each pallet, for a loss of
$109,000.
In his appeal, the shipper did not assert that each
package of resin rather than each pallet should have been
covered by $500; instead, he claimed that because the container
had been shipped under a clean bill of lading, stowage on deck
constituted an unreasonable deviation, invalidating the car-
rier's right to limit his liability. The court disagreed,
31
finding that on a vessel that has been retrofitted specifically
for the purpose of carrying containerized cargo on deck, on
deck stowage is not an unreasonable deviation and that by the
late 1960s, transporting containers on deck under a clean bill
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of lading had become a common and acceptable practice.
In 1974, the functional economics test was used again as
evidence in the court's decision in Cameco, Inc v. S. S.
74
American Legion that the container is not a package when the
bill of lading discloses the contents and when the cargo could
have been shipped break-bulk without further packaging. In
this case a container loaded with 270 cartons and four pallets
of 100 cases each of canned hams was stolen while in the
custody of the carrier. Since the hams were packed in the same
corrugated cartons used prior to containerization, they con-
stituted functional packing units, placing the burden on the
carrier to show why his liability should be limited to $500 for
the container. The court awarded the shipper a full recovery
after the carrier failed to prove why the container was equi-
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valent to a package.
This case had the unfortunate result of strengthening the
validity of the functional economics test as a means of esta-
blishing carrier liability. Even after the test was abandoned
in a later case, the reasoning behind it still appears to
influence some courts in their decisions concerning
containerized cargo.
Two landmark decisions were made by the second circuit in
1981 concerning containerized cargo that provided still more
32
support for the concept that where the bill of lading discloses
the contents of the container, the container is not a package
under COGSA. In Mitsui and~ Ltd. v. American Export Lines,
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Inc., the trial court found that "bundles" (stacks of 15) of
tin ingots shipped in a container, not the entire container,
constituted packages under COGSA.
The court based its decision primarily on what was
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written into the bill of lading, and under the assumption
that each bundle constituted a package, awarded the shipper
$62,000 for the lost cargo. The court of appeals affirmed the
award but for different reasons.
The appeals court felt that the stacks of ingots were not
packages because they were not wrapped or boxed in any way and
thus consituted "goods not shipped in packages." The bill of
lading included a clause that read:
The words 'shipping unit' shall mean each physical
unit or piece of cargo not shipped in a package,
including articles or things of any description
whatsoever, except goods shipped in bulk, and
irrespective of the weight or measurement unit
employed in calculating freight charges.78
According to this clause, liability should have been assessed
by the ingot; however, the bill of lading also incorporated
COGSA, which would ordinarily limit liability to $500 per long
ton, a lesser amount. As a result of this ambiguity as to
which "unit" was covered by the $500 limit, the court ruled
against the carrier as the party that drew up the contract.
On that basis, the court determined that the shipper
should have been entitled to recover $500 per ingot (as the
shipping unit); however, the court felt that the shipper mis-
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represented the manner in which the cargo had been stowed by
calling the stacks "bundles" as if they had been packaged in
some way. Because of this misrepresentation, the court decided
that each bundle of 15 ingots was the shipping unit, limiting
the shipper's recovery to $62,000.
One of the important results of this case is that revoked
the functional economics test as a method for determining
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shipowner liability. The court saw two dangers in employing
the functional economics test. The first is that if carriers
could limit their liability to $500 for the entire container
simply because the cargo did not lend itself to being "pac-
kaged" in a traditional manner, the purpose of COGSA would be
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defeated. The other danger is that shippers who want to
ensure that they receive the protection afforded them under
sec. 4(5) would be forced to lose the benefits of container-
ization by packaging cargo extensively so it would qualify as
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"packages" when little or no packaging is actually required.
The conclusion reached by this court was that the
functional economics test was not an equitable means of esta-
blishing liability because it placed an unfair burden on the
shipper to go to extra expense to package his cargo or else
accept that the carrier would not be liable for more than $500
for the entire container. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Oaks, the creator of the functional economics test, agreed that
the test should be abandoned:
In the realm of container shipping, where the bill of
lading specifies the contents, the ship's container
should not be deemed a package -- even presumptively
only -- irrespective of how the goods within it are
34
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packed.
A final case in which the contents of the container
constituted packages was also decided by the second circuit
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in 1981 in Smythgreyhound v. M/V 'Eurygenes'. This case
involved damage by fire to three shipments of 1500 cartons of
stereo equipment shipped in eight containers. Originally,
the district court referred the question of whether the
containers were packages to a court magistrate. The Magis-
trate first applied the functional economics test and found
that the cartons had been packed sufficiently to be shipped
break-bulk. leading to the conclusion that the cartons were
the packages. However, other factors led the Magistrate to
decide that the "subjective intent" of both parties was to
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treat the containers as COGSA packages.
The district court affirmed this conclusion but rejected
the Magistrate's reasoning that the shipper's "subjective in-
tent" was to consider the containers packages:
• no shipper ever actually intends that its
recovery will be limited to $500 per container, or
that any carrier, in the absence of an express agree-
ment, intends that the recovery should exceed $500
per container.85
Instead. the court based its decision on the fact that
the shipper chose to use the containers rather than ship break-
bulk, indicating "acquiescence" in treating the containers as
packages.
Pointing out that the benefits of containerization are
shared by both carriers and shippers, the court of appeals
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rejected the argument that a shipper who chooses to use
containers for the sake of convenience automatically assumes
that the container itself will be subject to the $500 per
package limit. In addition, the court found that the use of
both "containers" and "cartons" in the bill of lading indicated
that there was no agreement as to what constituted the package.
To resolve this question, the court examined the case law
developed by the same circuit in the past.
The court based its final decision on the one reached in
Mitsui: where the bill of lading discloses the contents of the
container, the container will not be treated as the COGSA
package regardless of who stuffed and sealed it, why the ship-
per used it, or whether the carrier had verified the contents:
Mitsui and our decision today will put carrier
interests on notice that the container will not be
considered the COGSA "package" where the bill of
lading disclosed the contents of the container. Mit-
sui's holding is consistent with the congressiona-l---
purpose of establishing a reasonable minimum level of
liability.86
The shipper recovered $500 per carton. The court conceded that
this decision did not answer all questions concerning the
package limitation but it did indicate that in most cases,
liability should not be limited to $500 for the container.
Each final decision in this section was made under the
assumption that section 4(5) of COGSA was designed to protect
the shipper by establishing a level of liability high enough to
motivate carriers to care properly for the cargo. With this in
mind, it is difficult to appreciate the second circuit's most
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recent decision concerning containerized cargo, which seems to
negate much of the ground gained by shippers by 1981.
D. Liability limited to $500 per container even when the bill
of lading discloses the contents.
In 1984, Judge Sofaer of the southern district of New York
awarded the shipper of two containers of plants damages of
$80,322, the total value of the goods, after determining that
the carrier had been negligent in caring for the cargo. In
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Binladen B ~ ~ Landscaping v. ~ ~ Nedlloyd 'Rotterdam' , two
containers of live plants shipped from the U.S. arrived dead at
Saudi Arabia oecause the carrier had provided the shipper with
one container that had a faulty ventilation system and had
failed to start the refrigeration unit soon enough in other
container. The district court found that the individual plants
within the containers constituted COGSA packages because some
of them had been individually wrapped, potted, and boxed and
because the bill of lading disclosed the contents as being
"7790 Live Plants" for one container and "11420 Live Plants
Misc. and 24 packages shade cloth" for the other. Judge Sofaer
based his decision on the precedent set in Mitsui and Smyth-
greyhound that the container is not a COGSA package when the
bill of lading discloses the contents.
In a decision that is certain to have long-lasting ef-
fects, the second circuit determined that based on the wording
of the bill of lading (listing the number of containers as the
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packages and listing the number of plants under the description
of the cargo), this was a case of goods not shipped in pac-
kages. In a reversal of the conclusions reached by the same
circuit in Mitsui and Smythgreyhound, Judge Mansfield stated:
••• we are satisfied, not withstanding our tra-
ditional reluctance to treat a container as a COGSA
package, that the terms of the bill of lading should
govern; if the bill of lading lists the container as
a package and fails to describe objects that can
reasonably be understood from the description as
being packages, the container must be deemed a COGSA
package. This rule not only accords with the 1968
Brussels Protocol ••• 88 but has the virtue of cer-
tainty.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We accordingly hold that, when the bill of lading
does not clearly indicate an alternative number of
packages, the container must be treated as a COGSA
package if it is listed as a package on the bill of
lading and if the parties have not specified that the
shipment is one of "goods not shipped in packages."
Maximum damages in such a situation then are $500 per
container, irrespective of the contents. Although
this rule could drastically reduce the damages
available to shippers in some situations, it does not
depart from the principle that the limited liability
clause in COGSA was designed to "set a reasonable
figure below which the carrier should not be per-
mitted to limit his liability."
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We recognize that the rule established by us
today, which will henceforth limit a carrier's
liability under the same circumstances to $500 per
container, resolves an uncertainty noted in earlier
decisions ••• and that, in view of this uncer-
tainty, the parties might have reasonably believed
that the description of the number of plants on the
bills of lading was sufficient to bring the shipment
within the Smythgreyhound rule to the effect that a
container whose contents are disclosed ••• should
not itself be treated as a package.89
Accordingly, the court determined that liability in this case
should be determined on the basis of $500 per freight unit.
Since freight was charged at a per-container rate, the carrier
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will most likely be able to limit his liability to $1000 for
the two containers.
This decision poses several significant problems. The
first is that even when the shipper has disclosed the contents
of the container, unless the cargo is of the sort that lends
itself to being packaged in boxes or crates, liability will
most likely be limited to $500 for the entire container. This
is especially true considering the recent trend by carriers to
offer per-container freight rates regardless of the weight or
size of the cargo inside the container.
As Judge Feinberg stated in his dissent in Standard
Electrica, S. A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-
Gesellschaft, these cases should always be decided with the
shipper's interests in mind and with the understanding that the
$500 limitation was originally intended to result in total
compensation to the shipper of most cargoes:
The purpose of section 4(5) when enacted in 1936
was to protect cargo interests like appellant ••
Therefore, one would think that in a close case
section 4(5) would be construed cosistently with that
purpose -- to protect the cargo interest ••••
Inadequate it has become; technological advancement
and decline in the purchasing value of the dollar
have combined to reduce the meaning of the $500
minimum liability limitation Congress gave to cargo
interests. But I do not understand why we should add
to the inequity. The call for congressional revision
may be sound, but in the meantime we should construe
the existing statutory term as applied to the facts
before us in consonance with its legislative pur-
pose.90
In fact, it is difficult to imagine a container-load of
any cargo that would be worth only $500. This alone should
discourage the courts from allowing carriers to limit their
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liability under any condition to $500 for the container. In
Binladen, we are asked again to accept the result that a car-
rier can limit his liability to $500 for the entire container
simply because the shipper has not gone to the needless expense
of putting his cargo into individual cartons when that was not
required to protect his goods. While this decision may lead to
certainty, it is "certainty at the expense of equity" and is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of COGSA -- to provide
substantial protection to shippers of most cargoes.
Certainty would also be achieved if the courts determined
that the container should never be a COGSA package or freight
unit for the purposes of establishing liability. Legal counsel
for cargo interests can provide compelling evidence for this
conclusion. They point out that the container usually belongs
to the carrier and must be returned to the carrier after every
voyage, while the packaging material of a true package
obviously belongs to the shipper or consignee and is destroyed
after one or two uses. The container was invented by a ship-
ping company to decrease stevedoring costs and facilitate the
handling of large numbers of packages at one time so that turn-
around time in port would also decrease. The container is
functionally a part of the ship's gear; at one point it is
analogous to the slings that were used to move large numbers of
packages from the pier into the ship's hold for break-bulk
shipments, and later is analogous to the hold itself, in which
91
cargo is stowed, not packaged.
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In addition, all of the tests invented by the courts to
determine when a container should be the package, (whether the
cargo could have been shipped break-bulk without further pac-
kaging, who stuffed the container, and whether the carrier had
verified the contents of the container), are extraneous matters
that were never incorporated into COGS A and simply cloud the
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issue. The fact is that the act was written to force car-
riers to pay for their negligence; that is one reason why
carriers buy P & I (protection and indemnity) insurance.
Another reason that cOGSA was written was to ensure that car-
riers would not have to pay for damage that was not caused by
their negligence. This is why shippers buy cargo insurance
to pay for damage caused by the exceptions to liability in-
eluded in cOGSA. By allowing the carriers to limit their
liability to $500 for the entire container for damage caused by
their negligence, the courts have returned shippers to their
status before cOGSA was enacted, when carriers could escape
liability by writing very low limits into the bill of lading.
Naturally, carrier interests think otherwise; they argue
that the shipper always has the option to pay a higher rate to
increase carrier liability. This is true, but it ignores the
fact that the $500 per package limitation is supposed to cover
the value of most packages, except for very high value goods,
and still does so as long as the container is not considered
the package. When liability is limited per container, even the
shipper of low value goods in not protected. Also, most ship-
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pers assume that their "packages" or items within the container
(be they potted plants, stereo components, or cartons of adding
machines), are adequately covered by the $500 limit. They
therefore have no reason to declare a higher value.
Some have argued that if the carriers are held liable for
$500 for the individual items in the container, the shipper
will pay anyway when freight rates soar as carriers buy more
insurance to cover the damages:
it makes little difference to the carriers
whether the limitation is $500 or $50,000. A
predictable limitation most importantly serves the
purpose of letting the parties know beforehand
whether the shipper will arrange his own insurance
for the excess above the limitation, or whether the
risk is to be covered by the carrier and reflected in
the carrier's freight rate. Either way, the cost of
insuring the shipper's property from transportation
loss will ultimately fall upon its owner. It is
unrealistic to think that the carrier will insure the
shipper's property out of its own pocket.93
This statement ignores the effect that inflation has had
on the level of protection received by shippers and the fact
that the inherent value of cargo has risen dramatically since
1936. If the limitation had been allowed to fluctuate with
inflation, the $500 limit of 1936 would be approximately $3400
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today.
Obviously, this law needs to be amended; application of
the $500 provision today is neither predictable nor equitable.
The international shipping community recognized the deficiences
of this provision in the era of containerization and modified
the Hague Rules accordingly in two protocols to the Brussels
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Convention, while third world shippers have formulated new
rules (the Hamburg Rules) that offer them even more protection.
The United States, however, has not ratified the protocols or
the Hamburg Rules and is just now considering amending COGSA to
make it more appropriate for today's shipping practices. The
next chapter contains an examination of all of these proposed
changes as they pertain to the per package limitation of ship-
owner liability.
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Chapter 4: Visby, Hamburg, and H. R. 277
By the late 1950s, some provisions of the Hague Rules had
become obsolete; the £100 per package limitation no longer
offered shippers adequate protection because i n f l a t i o n was
reducing the actual value of the limit at the same time that
the inherent value of the cargo being shipped was increasing.
In addition, as containerization of general cargo became more
prevalent in the 1960s, the term "package" started to lose its
clarity. These three factors led to increased litigation over
cargo claims and made it obvious to the shipping community that
some revision of the Hague Rules was necessary to make them
more appropriate for modern shipping practices.
Since the 1960s, two groups have been active in at-
tempt ing to update the condit{ons of shipowner liability to
cargo. The CMI, as the original creators of the Hague Rules,
have chosen simply to amend the old rules while UNCTAD (and
UNCITRAL) have pushed for a completely new system that would
recognize the increasing role of third world countries in
international shipping. This chapter examines these two dif-
ferent efforts, pointing out some of the benefits and
deficiencies of both, and contains a brief look at the bill
that the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
reported out to Congress in 1985 to amend COGSA.
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Part One: The First Visby Amendments
In 1959, the CMI convened to review and revise the Hague
Rules per package limitation because inflation had rendered the
£100 limit inadequate as protection for most shippers. In 1963,
they proposed changing the £100 limitation to 10,000 Poincare
francs per package, worth approximately $662 at that time.
This proposal was the subject of the Twelfth Session of the
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law held in Brussels in May
1967 and February 1968. The outcome of this conference was the
formulation of the 1968 Protocol to amend the 1924 Brussels
Convention. In the context of tnis study, the most important
modifications are found in Articles 2(a) and 2(c), (written to
replace portions of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules), which
read:
2(a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have
been declared by the shipper before shipment and
inserted in the Bill of Lading, neither the carrier
nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable
for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of Frs.
10,000 per package or unit or Frs. 30 per kilo gross
weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is
higher.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article
of transport is used to consolidate goods, the number
of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading
as packed in such article of transport shall be
deemed the number of packages or units for the pur-
poses of this paragraph as far as these packages or
units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such
article of transport shall be considered the package
or unit.
The first clause changes the limit from 100 pounds
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sterling to 10,000 poincare francs per package (based on a gold
value), thus increasing carrier liability to approximately $662
per package. As an alternative to the per package limitation,
it allows shippers to collect damages of approximately $0.90
per kilo of cargo when that produces a higher recovery. The
second clause attempts to clarify the meaning of the term
"package" as it applies to containerized cargo by stating that
when the shipper has enumerated the contents of the container
in the bill of lading, the individual items within the
container, not the entire container-load, will be covered up to
10,000 francs ($662).
The first meeting held in May 1967 was devoted mainly to
the creation of the new limit. During this meeting, the United
States and Norwegian delegations proposed abolishing the per
package limitation altogether and replacing it with a
95
limitation based solely on weight. The U. S. delegation felt
that a limit based on weight would provide better protection to
shippers of containerized or palletized cargoes. Norway,
however, sought a limitation of $3.70 per pound gross weight to
achieve uniformity with the newly created International
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Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR).
Both proposals were met with opposition from those who
believed that this system would not adequately compensate ship-
pers of high value, low weight goods. To overcome these ob-
jections, the Norwegians proposed a limitation equal to $662
per package, but not less than $.90 per pound gross weight as
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long as the weight of the cargo had been inserted in the bill
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of lading. The U. S. delegates were concerned that this
proposal would limit recovery to too Iowa value if the
container were treated as a package and instead, proposed a
similar compromise of $662 per package or $3.70 per pound,
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whichever was higher. Decisions on these proposals were
postponed until the second meeting held in February 1968.
During the second meeting, the United States agreed to
the $662/package or $0.90/pound limits provided that a clause
was included that would prevent the container from being
treated as the package. The proposed clause read:
••• provided that a container, pallet or similar
article of transport equipment used for consolidating
cargo shall not be deemed to be a "package" within
the meaning of this paragraph.99
After some criticism, the force of the clause was softened to
allow the container to be treated as a package when the con-
tents are not disclosed in the bill of lading:
Where a container, pallet or similar article of
transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of
packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading
shall be deemed the number of packages or units for
the purposes of this paragraph. Otherwise, such
article of transport shall be considered the package
or unit.lOO
Even in this form, the clause was still aimed at pro-
tecting the shipper of containerized cargo by ensuring that the
carrier would not be able to limit his liability to $662 for
the entire container as long as the contents were described in
the bill of lading. It is important to note that this clause
did not imply that the shipper would have to pay an ad valorum
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rate just for enumerating the contents in the bill of lading;
at this point, simply disclosing the number of packages or
units was sufficient to prevent the carrier from limiting to
$0.90 per pound or $662 for the container.
In a rather startling about-face, the British delegation
proposed instead a clause stating that the container would be
considered a package unless the shipper enumerated the con-
tents:
When any goods received into his charge by the car-
rier are shown in the bill of lading as being, or as
being packed in, any container, pallet or similar
article of transport used to consolidate freight,
such container, pallet or other article shall be
deemed to be a package or unit for the purpose of
this clause, unless some smaller unit has been
declared by the shipper before shipment as being a
package or unit for such purpose and the number and
description of such smaller units has been inserted
in the bill of lading.101
The wording of this clause was chosen specifically to
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correspond to Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules that has been
used to justify ad valorum rates. The implication was that the
shipper would be expected to pay a higher rate just for dis-
closing the contents in the bill of lading, even if he only
wanted each package or unit in the container to be covered by
the $662 limit. It was the hope of the U.S. delegation, how-
ever, that the practice of charging ad valorum rates would be
discontinued under the new protocol because it has proven too
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costly to shippers in recent years.
From the 1920s through the 1940s, declaring a higher
value for the cargo was usually unnecessary because most pac-
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kages were worth less than the £100 or $500 limit, but the
value of cargo has since increased, with the actual power of
the limit decreasing as a result of inflation. This has forced
shippers either to insure their cargo with independent under-
writers or pay an exhorbitantly high increase in the freight to
cover the value of the cargo. The unreasonably high ad valorum
rates have prevented most shippers from exercising this op-
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tion. By not declaring a higher value for their cargo,
however, shippers are frequently trapped because many courts
have taken the failure to declare as proof that the shipper has
acquiesced to treating the container as the package. It was
this situation that the U. S. delegates had hoped would be
avoided by amending the old rules.
The fear of the U.S. delegates was that with the clause
proposed by the British, the carrier would automatically charge
a higher rate when the shipper disclosed the contents of the
container. They foresaw a situation in which shippers would be
discouraged from disclosing the contents because of the ex-
cessively high rates accompanying the disclosure, thus allowing
the container to be treated as the package. Liability would
then be limited to the unreasonably low amount of $0.90 per
pound. Since the purpose of this conference was to raise the
level of carrier liability, not lower it, the United States
delegation led a successful move to defeat the British pro-
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posal.
On the surface, Articles 2(a) and 2(c) appear to offer a
49
much greater level of protection to shippers by establishing
liability on the per package or unit basis, or on the per
weight basis, whichever is higher, and by preventing the con-
tainer from being treated as a package when the contents are
disclosed in the bill of lading. The 1968 Protocol has not
received full support from many American authorities, however,
because the intent of these two clauses, as indicated by the
chairman of the conference before the amendments were passed,
would still be to-allow the carriers to charge an ad va10rum
rate whenever the shipper disclosed the contents of the con-
tainer, even if the shipper did not want coverage greater than
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$662 per package or unit.
Despite two recommendations from the Maritime Law As-
sociation of the United States that the protocol be ratified,
it has never been submitted to the Senate for approval, a1-
though some U.S. courts have attempted to apply clause 2(c),
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albeit incorrectly, in some container cases. Despite the
lack of support from the United States, the 1968 Protocol
entered into force on 23 June 1977, having been ratified by
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several major maritime nations.
One question that has arisen regarding the protocol is
the meaning of the term "unit" in clauses 2(a) and 2(c). The
same term was used in the Hague Rules, and when COGSA was
written, it was replaced with "customary freight unit" to
clarify its meaning. Under Hague or COGSA, liability based on
the freight unit usually meant using the long ton, 40 cubic
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feet, 100 pounds, and most recently, the container-load as the
units. However, since the 1968 Protocol contains the alter-
native method of limiting liability on a per weight basis, the
term "unit" in the amendments has become synonymous with unpac-
kaged "object" or "item" when the amendments are control-
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ling.
With this interpretation of the term having been accepted
by the shipping industry and most legal authorities, the ap-
peals court in Binladen was incorrect in stating that its
decision to limit liability to $500 per freight unit was con-
sonant with the 1968 Protocol. While limiting liability in
this case to the freight unit may have been correct under
COGSA, under the Protocol each plant within the containers
would clearly have been the "units" and the shipper would have
recovered the full $80,000 for the lost cargo, not $500 per
container. Application of this Protocol in the cases involving
large pieces of machinery discussed earlier would have allowed
using the per weight calculation to determine liability. With
this method, a recovery limited to $500, as occurred in
Aluminios Pozuelo, would have been impossible.
In summary, there are two ways to view this protocol: the
first is that it authorizes carriers to charge ad valorum rates
automatically whenever the contents of the container are de-
clared in the bill of lading. This would most likely inhibit
shippers from enumerating the number of packages or units, with
the result that the container would be treated as a package.
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With this interpretation, shippers might be in a better
position under COGSA, as long as the courts continue to prevent
carriers from limiting their liability to $500 per container
when the shipper discloses the contents. Unfortunately, as
Binladen proves, shippers cannot always depend on that outcome.
The other view is that the amendments offer shippers greater
protection in two ways -- by ensuring that the individual
packages or unpackaged objects within the container are each
covered by the limit (provided the contents are disclosed in
the bill of lading), and by allowing a recovery based on weight
when that would produce a greater value (such as for large
pieces of machinery or for goods shipped as bulk in con-
tainers).
It would appear that the protocol offers shippers two
benefits. It leads to predictability because the shipper is
guaranteed coverage over the individual contents of containers
whenever they are enumerated in the bill of lading, and it
produces a far more equitable result in claims for damage to
very large and heavy cargoes by establishing liability on a
weight basis. It would seem that these two benefits outweigh
the potential disadvantage to shippers -- that carriers could
charge a higher rate whenever the contents of the container are
enumerated in the bill of lading. In fact, this disadvantage
could be negated if the United States ratified the 1968
Protocol with the understanding that ad valorum rates could
only be charged by carriers if the shipper wanted to increase
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the limit per package, unit, or kilo, above the values
stipulated in the amendments. An added improvement to the
protocol would be to establish an ad valorum rate structure
that would be sufficient to cover the carrier's added costs but
low enough that shippers would willingly pay the higher rate
when more coverage was necessary.
Until the United States takes these or similar steps,
however, courts will continue to be faced with uncertainty as
to how to apply antiquated limitation laws to a vastly dif-
ferent shipping industry, resulting in perversions of the in-
tent of COGSA such as occurred in Binladen and Aluminios
Pozuelo.
Part Two: The Hamburg Rules
At about the time that the 1968 Protocol was adopted by
the CMI, two U.N. organizations that are particularly sensitive
to the trade needs of developing states, UNCTAD and UNCITRAL,
began a review of international law governing shipping prac-
tices, especially bill of lading use and common carrier
liability. It was their belief that a new legal regime, more
appropriate for use by developing states, was needed to replace
the Hague Rules, which had been designed in the early 1900s by
the few major maritime powers that continue to dominate inter-
national shipping today. The developing states, whose
nationals are primarily cargo owners rather than shipowners,
wanted a system ~n which they would not have to rely on the
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developed states' insurance industry to obtain protection for
their cargoes, and where carriers assumed responsibility for
any losses caused while the cargo was in their custody.
The result of the review was that in 1976, UNCITRAL
submitted a draft convention on carriage of goods by sea to the
U.N. Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea held in
Hamburg, Germany. The conference adopted the Convention on the
Carriage of Goods by Sea (the Hamburg Rules) on 31 March 1978.
Although many states have signed the new convention, no major
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maritime nation has ratified it or expects to do so.
A. Carrier liability under the Hamburg Rules
Where the Hague/Visby rules represent a balance between
cargo and carrier interests from the developed states, the
Hamburg Rules are a compromise between developed and developing
III
state needs. These rules are almost a throw-back to the
situation that existed in the U.S. prior to the passage of the
Harter Act, in which carriers were strictly liable for all
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damage, with only a few exceptions. Although the developing
states failed to get a regime of strict liability for carriers
in the Hamburg Rules, they did succeed in increasing sig-
nificantly the conditions under which the carrier would be
liable for cargo damage. Under Article 5(1) of the new con-
vention, the carrier is liable for all damage unless he can
prove that he or his agents "took all measures that would
113
reasonably be required to avoid" the damage. This
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"liability with fault" stipulation means that the carrier can-
not escape liability for damage caused by negligence in
navigation or management of the vessel, or for damage caused by
any of the other exceptions to 1iabi1ty stipulated in the Hague
Rules, even if he can prove that he exercised due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy. In addition, the carrier is liable
114
for damage caused by delay in the delivery of the goods, and
by fire if the claimant can prove that the fire was caused by
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the fault or neglect of the carrier.
B. Burden of Proof under the Hamburg Rules
A very important change in the Hamburg Rules involves
burden of proof. Under Hague/COGSA, the carrier has the burden
of proving two things: (a) that he exercised due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy, and (b) that the damage was caused
by one of the exceptions to liability stipulated in Article
4(2). Once the carrier has met this burden, the burden shifts
to the shipper to prove that damage was caused by the carrier's
negligence in the care and custody of the cargo. Under the
Hamburg Rules, with the exception of damage caused by fire, the
carrier always has the burden of proving that cargo loss or
damage was not caused by his negligence.
The first major change, instituting a liability with
fault regime, is in fact much more reasonable today than the
situat ion that exists under the Hague Rules. While a provision
allowing carriers to escape liability for damage caused by
55
negligence in navigation or management of the vessel may have
been reasonable in the early days of ocean transport of cargo,
there is no legitimate reason today that carriers should be
excused from liability caused by such negligence in the age of
radar, sophisticated electronic aids to navigation, and other
devices that help steer and propel modern vessels. The other
provision, the burden of proof always resting with the carrier,
is also more appropriate since the carrier is always privy to
the necessary evidence, if it exists, to prove his case. The
shipper, on the other hand, usually cannot readily obtain
evidence of a carrier's negligence. Naturally, these two pro-
visions of the Hamburg Rules have not been met with great
enthusiasm by carrier interests.
c. Achieving harmony with other transport conventions
One of the objectives of the writers of the Hamburg Rules
was to bring ocean carrier liability law in line with laws
governing liability of air, rail, and motor carriers. Ac-
cordingly, the wording of the "liability with fault" provision
of the Hamburg Rules is similar to the liability provisions in
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the other transport conventions. Some observers have
criticized this wording as too great a change from the
traditional language in carriage of goods by sea law, which
could have been incorporated in a manner that would have
achieved the same goals but which would have been more readily
accepted and more easily applied with reference to past
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cases.
Another way that the Hamburg Rules conform to the other
international transport conventions is in the use of the SDR as
the unit of account used to determine carrier liability. The
decision to use the SDR arose from the 1976 IMCO Conference
that chose to use the SDR in the Convention on Limitation of
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Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976. It was thought by the
writers of the Hamburg Rules that the SDR, a unit based on a
"basket of currencies," would be more stable than a unit based
on a gold value. (The use of the SDR has been so widespread in
transport liability conventions that the CMI has chosen it to
replace the Poincare franc in the 1979 Protocol amending the
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Hague Rules.) Article 6(1) of the 1978 Convention limits
carrier liability to 835 SDRs (about $825) per package or other
shipping unit, or 2.5 SDRs (about $2.47) per kilo of gross
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weight, whichever is higher, while article 6(2) contains a
container clause similar to the one incorporated into the 1968
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Protocol amending the Hague Rules.
D. Bill of lading requirements in the Hamburg Rules
A very important change in the Hamburg Rules is the
requirement in article 15 that very specific information, such
as the number of packages or units within containers and the
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weight of the cargo, must be included in the bill of lading.
This clause could be interpreted as implying that since this
information is obligatory in the bill of lading, carriers could
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only charge a higher rate if the shipper wishes to raise the
limits above 835 SDRs per package or 2.5 SDRs per kilo. If
this interpretation were to be adopted, it would avoid the
ambiguity in the 1968 Protocol that some authorities believe
entitles the carrier to charge a higher rate whenever the
shipper enumerates the contents of the container in the bill of
lading.
In summary, the Hamburg Rules attempt to force carriers
to accept a far greater level of liability not just by raising
the per package limit to about $825, but also by discarding the
seventeen exceptions to liability found in Hague/Visby and by
placing the burden of proof entirely on the carrier to show
that damage was not caused by his negligence. In addition, the
1978 Convention seems to avoid the potential problem in the
1968 Protocol -- allowing carriers to charge higher rates for
enumerating the contents of containers in the bill of lading --
by requiring this information at all times.
Unfortunately, the only part of the Hamburg Rules that
has been readily accepted is the use of the SDR as the unit of
account. The general feeling in the major maritime nations
(held primarily by carrier interests) is that these rules would
disrupt the balance already achieved between carriers and ship-
pers in the Hague/Visby Rules and would require a re-working of
the distribution of risks between cargo insurers and P & I
insurers. Also, if some countries adopt the Hamburg Rules
while others continue under the Hague/Visby system, the con-
flict of laws that will arise could create a significant inter-
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ference in the flow of commerce.
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Many shippers, even those
from the U.S., are more supportive of the 1978 Convention.
They see it as a good opportunity to increase carrier liability
to a reasonable level and to simplify the terms under which
liability is determined. Cargo insurers and carriers, who
believe they would suffer under the Hamburg Rules, feel that
the answer lies in the continued updating of the original
regime on a world-wide basis as new technologies and shipping
practices create a demand for clarification and change.
Part Three: Amending COGSA: Will it be Visby or Hamburg?
Recently, Dow Chemical Company petitioned the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC) to clarify the definition of the term
"package" in COGSA. The FMC refused on the grounds that only
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the court system or Congress had the authority to do so.
Finally responding to long-standing shipper demands, the House
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries in August 1985
introduced a bill to amend COGSA. Since the bill was intro-
duced just before Congress recessed, no hearings have been held
yet and the only information available at this time is the bill
itself.
The draft bill contains two alternatives for amending
COGSA. The first simply incorporates the 1968 and 1979 Visby
Amendments to the Hague Rules. Section 309 contains a con-
tainer clause similar to the one in the 1968 Protocol, which
states that when the contents of a container or pallet are
enumerated in the bill of lading, the container or pallet will
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not be treated as a COGSA package. This section also limits
shipowner liability to the same values as the 1979 Protocol --
666.67 SDRs per package or 2 SDRs per kilo gross weight, which-
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ever is higher.
A second version of section 309 is included at the end of
the bill and incorporates the Hamburg Rules rather than the
Visby Amendments. It appears that the intention here is that
both versions will amend COGSA if the bill is passed, but only
the section based on the Visby Amendments will immediately go
into effect. The Hamburg Rules version will only go into
effect by replacing the Visby Amendments if and when the 1978
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea enters into force
for the U.S., within one year after the deposit of the U.S.
instrument of ratification and notice of denunciation of the
Hague/Visby Rules, and when more seaborne foreign trade takes
place with states that recognize the Hamburg Rules rather than
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the Hague/Visby regime.
While an amendment of COGSA is long overdue, it is
unfortunate the this bill does not clarify those points that
caused concern in the 1968 Protocol, especially the question of
whether the carrier can charge a higher rate automatically when
the contents of the container are enumerated in the bill of
lading. The system of charging ad valorum rates also needs to
be refined so that shippers are not put in a position where
they find declaring the actual value of the cargo too costly to
obtain added protection for their cargo. In addition, the bill
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should include a better definition of the term "package" than
the one that appears in the draft, which obfuscates rather
than clarifies the meaning of the term. The definition needs
to state that "package" is synonymous with unpackaged items
or objects inside the container as well. Only if this term
is clarified sufficiently will the courts be able to apply
the law with consistency and fairness. Without a clari-
fication, however, shippers and carriers will continue to
disagree as to what is covered by the per package limitation,
so that the purpose of amending the bill will be defeated.
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Conclusion
The extent of shipowner liability to cargo owners has changed
significantly since the Harter Act was passed in 1893. During
the period when the Harter Act was the only law governing ocean
bills of lading, carriers could escape liability by writing
very low limits of liability into the bill of lading. One of
the purposes of amending the Harter Act by the formulation of
the Hague Rules and COGSA was to increase shipowner liability
to a very substantial value, £100 or $500 per package or
freight unit. This system worked smoothly for many years by
offering shippers complete protection for most cargo shipped in
break-bulk packages.
The benefits of the per package limitation began to shift
from shipper to carrier in the 1960s as the shipment of heavy,
high value machinery and the use of containers to consolidate
cargo became commonplace. The definition of the term "package"
lost its clarity as the courts extended its meaning to included
large unpackaged objects and entire container-loads of cargo,
with the result that carrier liability dropped to negligible
amounts.
In an effort to decrease the amount of litigation over
cargo claims, the CMI revised the Hague Rules in 1968 and 1979
by clarifying the terms of carrier liability, especially with
regard to containerized cargo, and by increasing the amount of
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protection received by shippers to a more reasonable level.
The United States has been very slow in acknowledging the
advantages of the amendments, primarily because of pressure
from U.S. shipowners who realize that under the amendments,
they would have less chance of being able to limit their
liability to $500 per container.
Shippers from developing countries have remained dis-
satisfied with the Hague/Visby regime because they feel that it
forces shippers to rely too - heavily on the developed states'
large cargo insurers for protection. As a result, the rules
formulated by UNCTAD and UNICITRAL in the interest of shippers
from developing states would place a far greater burden on car-
riers to compensate for cargo damage and would reduce the
importance of cargo insurers for protection. These rules are
appealing to many observers because they go a long way towards
simplifying the terms of carrier liability; however, carriers
oppose them because they would increase carrier liability in
several ways, and cargo insurers are concerned that all of
their business would shift to P & I insurers since most of the
risks would be transferred from the cargo owners to the ship
owners. These two groups have so far been successful in pre-
venting the adoption of these rules by the major maritime
nations.
Large shippers, especially those in the United States who
have not yet received the benefits of the Visby Amendments,
have expressed support for the Hamburg Rules, primarily because
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they feel that these rules would be even better than the Visby
Amendments in providing protection for their cargo and in
reducing the amount of litigation over cargo claims. The House
Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries has recognized
this interest by including the Hamburg Rules as well as the
Visby Amendments in their bill to amend COGSA. While adoption
of the Hamburg Rules is unlikely at this point, continued
pressure from U.S. shippers and an increase in the importance
of shippers from developing states in world trade could lead to
their adoption in the future.
Both the Hamburg Rules and the Visby Amendments attempt
to clarify the meaning of the term "package" as it pertains to
containerized cargo; however, some disagreement about the
definition still exists and is bound to be a point of
contention in cargo cases in the future. This problem could be
avoided if the shipping community would accept the fact that
the term "package" causes more trouble than it is worth and is
not necessary for the purpose of establishing the level of
carrier liability in the era of containerization. Perhaps a
better way of establishing liability would be to base it on a
percentage of the value of cargo shipped in a container. For
example, under the normal rate, the carrier would reimburse the
shipper for damages up to 50% of the value of the cargo in that
container. With the value of the cargo in each container
stated on the bill of lading, both the shipper and carrier
would know the minimum limit of the carrier's liability. The
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rate structure could be constructed so that the rate would
increase by a specific amount to increase coverage by incre-
ments of 10%. The shipper could pay a higher rate to increase
carrier liability, buy insurance from an independent insurer to
cover any damages above 50% of the cargo's value, or simply
accept the risk himself. The shipper would have a genuine
choice as long as ad valorum rates were high enough to cover
the carrier's added cost for increased liability but not too
high to prevent the shipper from paying a higher rate when he
wishes to increase carrier liability.
This would be such a vast change from the well-esta-
blished system of determining liability that acceptance of it
would be unlikely. It simply suggests that we do not need to
retain a system that results in constant variation of appli-
cation because of different interpretations of terminology, and
that we could progress beyond this archaic per package
limitation system that treats shippers of low and high value
cargoes and shippers of packaged and unpackaged goods
differently to a regime that provides all shippers with equal
and adequate protection.
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Committee on the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability by Clauses
in Bills of Lading, and on Certain other matters relating to
Bills of Lading," 25 February 1921.
4
51 Stat. 233, U.S.T. No. 931. The Senate Resolution of
1 April 1935, included in the instrument of ratification,
stated the following understanding: "That should any conflict
arise between the provisions of the Convention and the pro-
visions of the Act of April 16, 1936, known as the 'Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act', the provisions of said Act shall prevail."
According to Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 14,
pp. 137-138: "The term 'understanding' is often used to desig-
nate a statement when it is not intended to modify or limit any
of the provisions of the treaty in its international operation
but is intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal with
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some matter incidental to the operation of the treaty in a
manner other than as a substantive reservation. Sometimes an
understanding is no more than a statement of policies or prin-
ciples or perhaps an indication of internal procedures for
carrying out provisions of the treaty."
5
Benjamin W. Yancy, "The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA,
Visby, and Hamburg," Tulane Law Review 57 (1983), 1248.
According to a chart supplied by the House Committee on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, on 1 September 1981, 10,000
poincare francs equaled $7,735. Article 2(d) of the 1968
Brussels Protocol amending the Hague Rules defines the poincare
franc as a unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrams
of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred.
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The special drawing right is an artificial reserve unit
valued in terms of a "basket of 5 currencies" proportioned as
follows: US$0.54 (42%), DMO.46(19%), £0.071(13%), FO.74(13%),
and Y34.00(13%). 1984 World Currency Yearbook. (Brooklyn, N.
Y.: International Currency Analysis, Inc., 1985), p. 11.
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Table provided by the House Committee on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries.
9
Supra, note 5, at p. 1248.
10
Article 5(1): The carrier is liable for loss resulting
from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in
delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or
delay took place while the goods were in his charge as defined
in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants
or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required
to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
11
On 17 June 1985, 2.5 SDRs equaled $2.48. The value of
835 SDRs was $831.58. Wall St. Journal, 18 June 1985, p. 60.
12
Staggers Rail Act (P.L. 96.448), Motor Carrier Act
(P.L.96 298).
13
H. R. 277, 99th Cong., 1st sess., (1985).
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14
Dewey R. Villareal, Jr. "Carrier's Responsibility to
Cargo and Cargo's to Carrier," Tulane Law Review, 45 (1971),
773.
15
46 U.S.C. sect. 182: No owner of any vessel shall be
liable to answer for or make good to any person any loss or
damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever, which
shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board the vessel, by
reason or by means of any fire happening to or on board the
vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of
such owner.
16
F. Cyril James, "Carriage of Goods by Sea -- The Hague
Rules," U.Pa.L.Rev., 74 (1926), 673. For an example of the
long list of exemptions typically appearing in a bill of
lading, see James, p. 671.
17
46 U.S.C. sect. 190-196 (1964).
18
46 U.S.C. sect. 190: It shall not be lawful for the
manager, agent, master, or owner of any vessel transporting
merchandise or property from or between ports of the United
States and foreign ports to insert in any bill of lading or
shipping document any clause, covenant, or agreement whereby
it, he, or they shall be relieved from liability for loss or
damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in proper
loading, stowage, custody, care or proper del ivery of any and
all lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their
charge. Any and all words or clauses of such import inserted
in bills of lading or shipping receipts shall be null and void
and of no effect.
19
46 U.S.C. sect. 191: It shall not be lawful for any
vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between
ports of the United States of America and foreign ports, her
owner, master, agent, or manager, to insert in any bill of
lading or shipping document any covenant or agreement whereby
the obligations of the owner or owners of said vessel to exer-
cise due diligence properly [to] equip, man, provision, and
outfit said vessel, and to make said vessel seaworthy and
capable of performing her intended voyage, or whereby the
obligations of the master, officers, agents, or servants to
carefully handle and stow her cargo and to care for and
properly deliver same, shall in any wise be lessened, weakened,
or avoided.
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46 U.S.C. sect. 192: If the owner of any vessel trans-
porting merchandise or property to or from any port in the
United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make
the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned,
equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or
owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held respon-
sible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in
navigation or in the management of said vessel nor shall the
vessel, her owner or owners, charterers, agent, or master be
held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea or other
navigable waters, acts of God, or public enemies, or the in-
herent defect, quality, or vice of the thing carried, or from
insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or
for loss resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or
owner of the goods, his agent, or representative, or from
saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or from
any deviation in rendering such service.
21
Supra, note 5, at 1241.
22
Wharton Poor, "A New Code for the Carriage of Goods by
Sea," Yale Law Journal, 33 (1923), 138.
23
~ ~ al v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt
Aktiengesellschaft, (the Isis), Supreme Ct. of the U.S. 290
333, 54 S. Ct. 162, 78 L. Ed. 348. Justice Cardozo states: "We
are told that the provisions of the Harter Act. • will lead
to absurdity and hardship if an unseaworthy condition is to
take away from the carrier an exemption from liability for the
negligence of its servants in the management of the vessel
without a causal relation between the defect and the disaster.
The maritime law abounds in illustrations of the for-
feiture of a right or the loss of a contract by reason of the
unseaworthiness of a vessel, though the unseaworthy feature is
unrelated to the loss. The law reads into a voyage policy of
insurance a warranty that the vessel shall be seaworthy for the
purpose of the voyage. [I]rrespective of any relation of
cause and effect, the breach of warranty will vitiate the
policy."
24
Article 4(1): Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be
liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from unsea-
worthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part
of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy and to secure that
the ship is properly manned, equipped, and supplied and to make
the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts
of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their
reception, carriage, and preservation in accordance with the
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provisions of paragraph 1 of article 3.
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Supra, note 23.
26
Article 4(1): Whenever loss or damage has resulted from
unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due
diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming
exemption under this article.
27
Article 4(5): Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in
any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in
connection with goods in an amount exceeding 100 pounds
sterling per package or unit or the equivalent of that sum in
other currency unless the nature and value of such goods have
been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading.
28
International Shipping Conference, Report of the Inter-
national Shipping Conference held at Hotel Victoria, Northum-
berland Ave., London, 23-25 November 1921, p. 49.
29
Ibid., pp. 84-85.
30
Ibid., p. 201.
31
The other signatories were: Germany, Argentina, Fin-
land, France, Belgium, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Spain, Estonia,
Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Uruguay.
32
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on
S.1152: A Bill Relating to Carriage of Goods by Sea, 74th
Cong., 1st sess., 1935, p. 17. Recommendations to adopt the
Hague Rules were made by the U.S. Shipping Board in their
reports dated Dec. 1928, Nov. 1929, Dec. 1930, Dec. 1931, and
Dec. 1932.
33
S. 1295, 70th Cong., 1st sess. For a complete listing
of all bills concerning this issue introduced to Congress, see
the report on uniform ocean bills of lading prepared by the
Conference on Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading, Nov. 1930,
reprinted in supra, note 33, at 29.
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34
The White Bill, H. R. 12208, 70th Cong., 2nd sess.,
supra, note 33, at 31.
35
H. R. 3830, 71st Cong., 1st sess., above.
36
For a complete discussion of the changes made to the
Brussels Convention in the White Bill, see supra, note 33, at
32.
37
For a listing of the changes suggested by the Nov. 1930
conference, see supra, note 33, at 33-34.
38
Supra, note 33, at 40.
39
S. 1152, 74th Cong., 1st sess.,: A Bill Relating to
Carriage of Goods by Sea.
40
Hearings before the House Committee on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries on S. 1152, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., 1936,
on uniform ocean bills of lading, p. 25.
41
Ibid.
42
Supra, note 42, at 67.
43
Apples were shipped in cases or barrels; butter was
packed in cases, boxes or kegs; wool, jute, copra, cotton, and
silk were shipped in bales; refined sugar, rice, salt, coffee,
cement, flour, and fertilizer were shipped in bags; wine moved
in barrels; tobacco was shipped in hogsheads, bales, or cases;
oranges and eggs were shipped in crates. Alan E. Branch, The
Elements £i Shipping (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1970~
pp. 128-135.
44
1927 A.M.C. 511. In this case, a shipment of 15 pac-
kages of arsenic acid was damaged by seawater while in transit
between Japan and San Francisco. The bill of lading contained
a clause with faulty wording that left the limit of liability
unclear. As written, the clause read: "said company will not
become liable for any value exceeding one hundred dollars
($1000.00) [sic] upon each of the named packages, unless other
valuation is declared and so expressed in the Bill of Lading."
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The court made no attempt to discover which valuation the
carrier had intended -- $100 or $1000/package -- because it
found no evidence that the carrier had offered the shipper a
higher rate to increase the carrier's liability. The carrier
was found liable for the full amount of damage, $269/package.
45
1926 A.M.C. 379. Here, a clause limiting carrier
liability to 1000 francs (about $40.00) per package was not
upheld because the shipper was not offered a chance to declare
a higher value. This entitled the shipper to full compensation
for the short delivery of 332 cases of furs.
46
234 N.Y.S. 622 (1929), reduced and affirmed 238 N.Y.S.
50, 1930 A.M.C. 18. Three bales of silk were stolen while in
the custody of the carrier, with the carrier's employees sus-
pected of the theft. The bill of lading contained a clause
exonerating the carrier of liability for losses due to theft
even if committed by an employee of the carrier. The bill of
lading also contained a clause limiting carrier liability to
$100/package. On final appeal, the limitation clause was
struck down because it attempted to establish an absolute
limitation of carrier liability, which would remain the same
regardless of the freight rate paid. In addition, the carrier
was not entitled to exonerate himself from liability caused by
his negligence or by the wilful wrongdoing of his employees.
The carrier was found liable for the market value of the silk
at destination plus interest, $S67/package.
47
1928 A.M.C. 1672. The carrier had included in his bill
of lading the following clause: "The value of each pac-
kage • • • does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars,
unless otherwise stated herein on which basis the rate of
freight is adjusted."
Since it was clear to the court that the shipper had been
given the opportunity to declare a higher value, the shipper
claimed that he was not bound by the limitation clause because
the ship had made a deviation by overcarrying his cargo.
Infra, note 49. The court found no evidence that the cargo had
been carried beyond the port of destination and allowed the
carrier to limit his liability to $100 per package.
48
31 F. Supp. 948 (1940). The carrier claimed that he
was only liable for $1000 for the short delivery the two pac-
kages under section 4(5) of COGSA. The shipper asserted that
the carrier lost his right to limit because the vessel had
undertaken an unreasonable deviation, overcarrying his cargo
beyond the port of destination. Again, the court could find no
evidence that the cargo had been overcarried and that by not
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declaring a higher value in the bill of lading, the shipper had
to bear any loss above $500 per package.
49
Where the ship had deviated from the customary course
of the voyage, or the carrier had deviated from the agreed
method of transportation of the cargo, resulting in damage to
the cargo, the carrier forfeited the right to limit his
liability to the value stated in the bill of lading. A
deviation clause was included in section 4(4) of COGS A as well:
"Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property
at sea, or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be
an infringement or breach of this act or of the contract of
carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or
damage resulting therefrom: Provided, however, That if the
deviation is for the purpose of securing or delivering cargo or
passengers it shall, prima facie, be regarded as unreasonable."
Under COGSA, any unreasonable deviation deprives the shiponwer
of the right to limit his liability to $500 per package.
5049 F. Supp. 559, 64 F. Supp. 529, 138 F.2d 907, 159
F.2d 654. In this case, the shipper contracted with the car-
rier for shipment of 1867 boxes of lily of the valley pips
(rootstocks) from Rotterdam to New York. Since refrigerated
space was not available, the carrier agreed to stow the boxes
on top of hatch covers on deck, covered by tarpaulins to pro-
tect the pips from seawater. Instead, the carrier stowed the
boxes uncovered in the wings of the hatches. On arrival in New
York, the pips were found worthless, having been soaked by
seawater on the voyage. The court determined that the carrier
had deviated from the agreed method of transportation and
therefore forfeited his right to limit his liability.
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116 F. Supp. 386. Here, the Ford Motor Co. delivered
20 packages of automobiles and automobile parts to the Flying
Clipper for shipment to Guam. The carrier issued a clean bill
of lading, obligating him to stow the cargo below decks. (A
clean bill of lading is issued by the carrier when the cargo is
received by him in apparent good condition and indicates that
the cargo will be shipped below deck.) Instead, the carrier
stowed the crates on deck, resulting in $16,794 in damages to
eight of the packages, or approximately $2100!package. The
carrier claimed that he was entitled to limit to $500 per
package because although unreasonable deviation invalidated
limitation of liability clauses under the Harter Act, the $500
per package limitation under COGSA was absolute except where
the shipper has declared a higher value. The Court disagreed
and stated:
There is nothing in the history of the Act to indicate
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that Congress by fixing the limitation at $500 intended
to displace the doctrine of unjustifiable deviation which
was so firmly entrenched in maritime law. • •• [M]ere
negligence with regard to stowage or handling of the
cargo has never constituted deviation. Deck stowage
where under deck stowage is required is more than
negligence - it is deviation with resulting abrogation of
the contract.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
To uphold the carrier's contention that the
limitation of liability is absolute, regardless of a
fundamental breach which goes to the very essence of its
undertaking, would permit any carrier with recklessness
to violate the terms of the bill of lading, knowing that
it cannot be called upon to pay more than $500 per
package. Such a policy, if upheld, would immunize the
carrier against the consequences of its own wilful
actions at the expense of an innocent party. (pp. 389-
390)
52
136 N.Y.S.2d 574. In a total shipment of 222 bales of
goatskins, with 300-350 skins per bale valued at $260/bale,
sixty bales were found damaged to about one-half their value by
being infested and eaten by beetle larvae. The bales were
packed so that the skins were folded in half along the animals'
spines and bound together, with a skin used as a cover on both
ends. This kind of skin was usually treated with arsenic soap
to prevent infestation by beetles during shipment. The carrier
claimed that because the arsenic treatment in the damaged bales
had obviously been insufficient, the damage had actually been
caused by an inherent vice in the nature of the goods, one of
the exceptions to liability under COGSA. The court disagreed,
stating that the shipper was under no obligation to treat them
at all and that the infestation must have begun while the skins
were being shipped from Brazil to New York. Under COGSA, the
carrier has the burden of proving that damage was caused by one
of the exceptions to liability and that he had not been neg-
ligent in the care of the cargo. Since the carrier failed to
prove that the damage was caused by one of the exceptions, the
court found the carrier liable for the full value of the damage
less the 5% normally lost in the curing process, about $130 per
bale.
53
156 F.2d 603. The shipper sustained $676.94 in
damages to a package of rayon goods worth $1619.47, a loss of
41.8% of the value of the shipment. The carrier claimed he was
entitled to limit his liability to $500 for the entire package
under COGSA and that his actual liability to the shipper should
be 41.8% of $500, or $209, because of the pro-rating clause
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included in the bill of lading.
The court stated that under section 4(5) of COGSA carrier
is liable for any amount of loss sustained up to $500 per
package, unless a higher value in declared. The court felt
that allowing pro-rata clauses would be contrary to the in-
tention of the Hague Rules and COGSA, which was to prevent
carriers from limiting their liability below $500 per package.
As to the carrier's contention that the carrier is cheated out
of receiving a higher freight rate when the shipper does not
declare a higher value, the court stated that "[i]f the shipper
is willing to bear the risk of loss above that sum [$500], he
is privileged to ship at the normal rate; he owed the carrier
no duty to declare the value and pay a higher rate." (p. 605)
54
55 F. Supp. 798, affirmed 148 F.2d 141 (1945). Here, a
giant amusement crane was shipped from France to San Francisco
in 126 parts, only twenty of which were crated. During ship-
ment, twenty-two of the pieces, all unboxed, suffered damage by
being bent, kinked, and twisted. It was clear to the court
that the crane had been received by the carrier in good con-
dition and that the carrier had been negligent in the care of
the cargo. The carrier claimed that the pieces were not pac-
kages and because the crane was shipped as a single freight
unit with freight charged as a lump sum, he was only liable for
a total of $500 for all of the damage. The bill of lading
stated that the shipment consisted of 126 "colis" (packages)
and each piece of the crane had been weighed and inspected
before shipment. On that basis, and despite the single freight
paid for the entire unit, the court decided that each piece of
the crane was a COGSA package entitled to the $500 limit.
55
Containers are made in various sizes and designs to
accommodate a variety of cargoes. For a discussion of con-
tainerization and its implications, see Dietmar Blumenhagen,
"Containerization and Hinterland Traffic," Marit. Pol. and
Mgmt., 8 (1981), 197-206, and Henry Tombari, "Trends in-OCean-
borne Containerization and its Implications for the U.S. Liner
Industry," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 10 (1978),
311-329.
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160 F. Supp. 956, affirmed 263 F.2d 135 (1953).
57
The freight for various parts of the tractor was cal-
culated in three different ways -- some on a 100 pound basis,
some by the long ton (2240 pounds), and some on a 40 cubic foot
basis. With each freight unit covered by $500, the carrier's
liability came to $17,300. Judge Swan explained their decision
not to consider the tractor a COGSA package as follows:
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Apparently the appellant [carrier] contends that any
preparation of goods for ocean transportation converts
the goods into a "package." Such a construction of the
section would cause "a shipper who attempts to minimize
possible harm to his property by putting protective
covering on sensitive parts," to be placed in a worse
position than a shipper who makes no effort to reduce
the possibility of loss from inclement weather or
pilfering •••• Any test dependent upon extent of
external covering would lead to uncertainty and increase
litigation. We cannot believe that Congress intended
"package" to be defined in a way to produce such a
result. (p. 137)
Pointing out that the bill of lading listed "1 semi-
boxed" under the heading "No. of Pkgs.", Judge Moore in his
dissent stressed that what was written into the bill of lading
should not be completely disregarded because it provides
evidence as to the parties' intent and the courts should not
limit their conception of the term "package" to the layman's
definition. He also disagreed with the court's contention that
had a skid been used to aid in transporting the tractor, it
would have been considered a COGSA package:
To hold a piece of machinery a package simply because it
has skids attached and to limit liability for damage to
$500, where the same machinery without skids, if large
or heavy, would subject the carrier to a much greater
liability for loss, seems unreasonably to extend the
meaning of "package" and to bring about a result that is
highly inequitable. (p. 138)
58
277 F. Supp. 1008, affirmed 407 F.2d 152 (1968).
59
407 F.2d 155.
60
If liability had been calculated by the customary
freight unit ($500 per 40 cubic feet), maximum liablity would
have come to $6700, more than the actual amount of damages --
$3754. Instead, the shipper received $500 for the entire cargo
lost. The distinction between the circumstances in this case
and those in Gulf Italia is quite arbitrary and Judge Moore's
explanation o~is decision was hardly a reasonable response
to the shipper's complaint:
If shippers find the $500 per package limitation
outdated because of inflationary trends and
technological developments, the statute provides that
they can obtain at their option full coverage merely by
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declaring the nature and value of the goods in the bill
of lading and, where necessary, by paying a higher
tariff. On the other hand, if they are reluctant to pay
the higher charge and chose [sic] instead to gamble on
safe delivery, they cannot argue later that the statute
is inequitable. (pp. 155-156)
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320 F. Supp. 324, affirmed 491 F.2d 960 (1974).
62
The court stated: ". . based upon the number of
customary freight units applicable to the nonpackaged goods,
liability could well exceed the statutory limit of $500 per
package. It was not the purpose of the act, therefore, to
relieve the carrier of its normal responsibility for damage to
cargo or to unduly limit its liability for just claims when
goods have not been shipped in packages." (p. 962)
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"Any distinction based upon the subjective purpose
for which the skid was attached should not be the test for
resolving the issue. The skid certainly protected the
transformer to some extent though obviously unsuccessfully, by
preventing it from shifting and sliding, and from contact with
other cargo during transit. And, the skid could have been
utilized to facilitate the transportation of the transformer.
Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that by simply attaching the
transformer to a wooden skid the shipper created a "pac-
kage." • To hold that somehow a "package" evolved from
the mere attachment of the machine to a wooden skid seems a
highly unreasonable result." (p. 965)
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346 F. Supp. 1019, affirmed 483 F.2d 645 (1973).
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The following factors led to the trial court's decision
limiting the carrier's liability to $500 for the loss of cargo
worth $29,400:
1. The container was produced by the shipper's agent in
Berlin, not by the carrier.
2. The container had the appearance of a typical
general cargo package and did not look like the
standard 40'x 8'x 8' container.
3. It was delivered to the carrier in a sealed
condition.
4. No markings indicated the number of packages inside.
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5. The bill of lading read: "1 Container said to
contain machinery."
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Supra, note 62, at 649.
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378 F. Supp. 418, reversed 507 F.2d 342 (1974).
68
Judge Feinberg's dissenting opinion in Standard
Electrica at 375 F.2d 943, 948 in 507 F.2d 342, 346.
69
313 F. Supp. 1373, affirmed 451 F.2d 800 (1971).
70
The bill of lading, under the heading "No. and kind of
packages; description of goods" read: "1 container s.t.c. [said
to contain] 99 bales of leather." Another clause in the bill of
lading read:
SHIPPER HEREBY AGREES THAT CARRIER'S LIABILITY IS
LIMITED TO $500 WITH RESPECT TO THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF
EACH CONTAINER EXCEPT WHEN SHIPPER DECLARES A HIGHER
VALUATION AND SHALL HAVE PAID ADDITIONAL FREIGHT ON SUCH
DECLARED VALUATION ••• (p. 804)
One of the factors the court considered in making its
decision was that the 99 cartons of leather had steel straps
around them, qualifying them as bales, with the tariff being a
fixed price per kilo for leather in bales. A second factor was
that the shipper had disclosed the contents of the container in
the bill of lading, and a third was that the shipper loaded the
container with an agent of the carrier observing the loading
process.
71
Ibid., at 815.
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367 F. Supp. 793, affirmed 493 F.2d 97 (1974).
73
This means that with containerization, shippers have
lost one of their major weapons against carriers -- even if a
carrier supplied the shipper with a leaky container and losses
resulted from damage caused by rain or seawater because the
container had been stowed on deck, the carrier would only be
liable for $500 per package even though that damage would not
have occurred had the container been stowed below deck.
78
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514 F.2d 1291 (1974).
75
The bill of lading indicated the number of free cartons
and the number of pallets, lending further support to the
notion that the container was not a package. Another factor
that influenced the court was that the cargo could only have
been shipped in a refrigerated container because refrigeration
was not otherwise available on the ship. The Court felt that
since the shipper had no other choice but to use the container,
liability should not be limited to $500 per container. Two
other factors were that an agent of the carrier had observed
the loading of the container so the carrier had first-hand
knowledge of the contents, and that the carrier had also bene-
fitted from the shipper loading the container because he was
saved the cost of stuffing it himself.
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636 F.2d 807 (1981).
77
The bill of lading described the cargo as
s.t.c. 30 bundles of 438 pes. Grade A Tin Ingot."
value of the lost ingots was $369,404.40.
78
Supra, note 74, at 822.
"2 containers
The full
79
Judge Friendly discounted the reasoning behind the
functional economics test because in cases such as this where
the cargo was not shipped in packages, the test would auto-
matically lead to the presumption that the container was the
package:
"Although we have little difficulty with the suggestion
that cartons, crates and other units that were treated
as COGSA packages when they were shipped breakbulk
should ordinarily continue to be so treated when they
are shipped in containers, we do not discern a proper
basis for the other half of the Kulmerland test, i.e.,
the rule that the container is presumptively the package
where the units inside are not suitable for breakbulk
shipment. Even if this might tend to show that each of
those units is not a package ••• it does not at all
follow that the container is. It could just as
reasonably, indeed far more reasonably, be the case that
the goods are "not shipped in packages" at all -- a
class of cargo specifically provided for in [sec.]
4(5)." (p. 818)
79
80
"It did not take long for the carriers • • • to realize
that if they could persuade the courts to consider a container
rather than the smaller units stowed inside to be the "package"
for purposes of [sec.] 4(5) of COGSA, they would thereby prac-
tically nullify that section, since in today's world a suit for
$500 or even, where there were a number of containers, several
times that sum, would not warrant the cost • • • " (p. 819)
81
"••• the shipper who uses carrier-furnished con-
tainers may have reason to complain of a rule whereby he "can
avoid the 'package' limitation [i.e., a ruling that the con-
tainer is the package] when using containers only if he ships
goods packed in such a way that they need not be shipped in
containers" and thereby incurs significant economic waste un-
less such packaging would be required for subsequent distri-
bution, which is by no means always the case." (p. 819.)
82
Supra, note 74, at 825.
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666 F.2d 746 (1981).
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These other factors included the fact that the shipper
had stuffed and sealed the container without the carrier
verifying the contents, and that the bill of lading mentioned
"containers" several times and referred to "cartons" only once.
The final factor was that the shipper had the opportunity to
ship either break-bulk or by container and chose to ship by
container to decrease the risk of pilferage. These three
considerations led the Magistrate to determine that the con-
tainers constituted packages. Supra, note 81, at note 3 on 747-
745.
85
Ibid., note 5, at 748.
86
Ibid., at 753.
87
593 F. Supp. 546 (1984), reversed and remanded 759 F.2d
1006 (1985).
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Article 4(5)c of the 1968 Brussels Protocol reads:
"Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is
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the purpose of this paragraph as far as these packages or units
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Goods by Road (CMR), signed at Geneva on 19 May 1956, Arts.
17(1) and 17(2).
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359. For a complete analysis of the Hamburg Rules, see Samir
Mankabady, ed., The Hamburg Rules ~ the Carriage of Goods ~
Sea (London: A. W. Sijthoff, 1978) and for the Canadian per-
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Account of the Hamburg Rules," Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, 10 (1978), 13-38, and Les War~ "The SDR in Transport
Liability Conventions: Some Clarification," Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce, 13 (1981), 1-20.
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The only substantive change to the Hague Rules in the
1979 Protocol is in Article II l(a), which replaces the poin-
care franc in Article 4(5)a with the SDR:
Unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship
shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or
damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount
exceeding 666.67 units of account per package or unit or
2 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the
goods lost or damaged, whichever is higher.
Article II 2(d) defines the SDR.
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Article 6 l(a) reads: The liability of the carrier for
loss resulting from loss of or damage to goods according to the
provisions of article 5 is limited to an amount equivalent to
835 units of account per package or other shipping unit or 2.5
units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the goods
lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
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Article 6 2(a) reads: Where a container, pallet or
similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the
package or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of
lading, if issued, or otherwise in any other document
evidencing the contract of carriage by sea, as packed in such
article of transport are deemed packages or shipping units.
Except as aforesaid the goods in such article of transport are
deemed one shipping unit.
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Article 15 1, in part, reads:
The bill of lading must include, inter alia, the fol-
lowing particulars:
(a) the general nature of the goods, the leading marks
necessary for identification of the goods, an express
statement, if applicable, as to the dangerous character of
the goods, the number of packages or pieces, and the weight
of the goods or their quantity otherwise expressed, all such
particulars as furnished by the shipper:
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See John Moore, "The Hamburg Rules," Journal of Mari-
time Law and Commerce, 10 (1978), 1-11.
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See "FMC Dodges 'Package' Issue," American Shipper,
June 1985, pp.8, 10.
125
Section 30917 reads:
(a) In this section --
(I) "package" means, if goods are consolidated in a
container, pallet, or similar article of transportation used to
consolidate goods --
(A) each shipping unit enumerated in the bill of lading
or contract to transport the goods by sea and packed in the
article of transportation; or,
(B) if not enumerated, the container, pallet, or article
of transportation.
(2) "unit of account" means a Special Drawing Right (as
defined by the International Monetary Fund) converted into
United States dollars under the method used by the
International Monetary Fund on the date of judgment or a
date agreed to by the persons in the action.
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Section 30917(c) reads: Unless the shipper declares
and inserts in the bill of lading the nature and value of goods
being transported under a contract to transport goods before
the carrier takes charge of the goods, the carrier or the
vessel is liable for loss of, or damage to, the goods of not
more than an amount equal to the greater of --
(I) 666.67 units of account for each package; or
(2) 2 units of account for each kilogram of gross weight of
the goods lost or damaged.
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Section 30945 3(b) reads: The amendment made by sub-
section (a) of this section is effective when the following
have occurred:
(1) the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods
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by Sea, 1978 ("Hamburg Rules"), enters into force for the
United States.
(2) the Hamburg Rules have entered into force or, within
one year after deposit of the Unites States Governments's
instrument of ratification of the Hamburg Rules and
notification of denunciation of the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, 1924, as amended ("Hague-Visby Rules").
(3) more of the seaborne foreign trade of the United
States ••• us with foreign countries that have expressed
their consent to be bound by the Hamburg Rules through the
deposit of the instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession, than with foreign countries that are
parties to the Hague-Visby Rules and have not expressed their
consent to be bound by the Hamburg Rules.
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APPENDIX 1
Be it enaoted. by the Senate and House of Represeniciioe« of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That every bill of se~'fc,~~eo(Good'bY
lading or similar document of title which is evidence of a contract
for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States, in foreign trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions
of this Act.
TITLE I
SECTION 1. When used in this Act-
(a) The term "carr-ier" includes the owner or the charterer who
enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.
(b) The term "contract of carriage" applies only to contracts of
carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of
title. insofar as such document relates to the carriage of goods by
sea. "including any bill of lading or any similar document as afore-
said issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment
at which such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates
the relations between a carrier and a holder of the same.
(c) The term "goods" includes goods, wares, merchandise, and
articles of every kind whatsoever, except live animals and cargo
which by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck
and is so carried.
(d) The term "ship" means any vessel used for the carriage of
goods by sea.
(e) The term "carriage of goods" covers the period from the time
when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged
from the ship.
RISKS
SEC. 2. Subject to the provisions of section 6, under every contract
of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier in relation to the loading,
handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of such
goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and
entitled to the rights and immunities hereinafter set forth.
RESPONSmILITIES AND LIABILITIES
SEC. 3. (1) The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning
of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to--
(a) Make the ship seaworthy;
(b) Properly man, equip, and supply the ship;
(c) Make the holds, refrigera ting and cooling chambers, and all
other parts of the shi p in which goods are earned, fit and safe for
their reception, carriage, and preservation.
(2) The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.
(3) After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier, or the
master or agent of the carrrer, shall, on demand of the shipper, issue
to the shipper a bill of lading showing among other things-
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods
as the same are furnished in writing by the shipper before the load-
ing of such goods starts, provided such marks are stamped or other-
wise shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or on the cases or
coverings in which such goods are contained, in such a manner as
should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the voyage.
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity
or weight, as the case may be, as furlll?~ed in writing by the shipper.
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods: Provided,
That no carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, shall be bound to
state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, quantity, or
weizht which he has reasonable ground for suspecting not accurately
to ~epresent the goods actually received, or which he has had no
reasonable means of checking.
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(4) Such a bill of lading: shall be pri,ma facie evidence of the Evidence oCreceipt,
receipt by the car rier of the zoous as therein described ill accordance .
with paragraphs (3) (a), tb), and (c), of this section : Pr,ov~d.ed, :~~g law not at.
That nothing in this Act shall ~e construed as repealing o~ liIDl~mg (ec~~1:39. p. 53.'l; G. s.
the application of any part of the Act, as amended, entitled An c.,.0. 2::!!.2.
Act relating to bills of lading in interstate and foreign commerce",
approved August 29,1916 (D. S. C., title 49, sees, -81- 124) : commonly
known as the "Pomerene Bills of Lading Act."
(5) The shipper s~all be deemed to ?uve guaranteed to the cun;ier ",c~ ~.Ja,;':ee~~Y
the accuracy at t~e t~me of shIpment of the marks, numberl quantl~y , ~6f.er; indemwty tor
an d weight, as, furnished by him; and the shipper, shall indemnify
the carrier uguinst ail loss , damages, and e.:!pens,es anslll~ or res';lltmg
from inaccuracies III such particulars, The right of the carrrer to
such indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility and liability
under the contract of carriage to any person other than the shipper.
(6) Unless notice of loss or damuze and the zeneral nature of Removal to be prima
, • • .>=> ::> . . raeie evidence ot ueuv -
such loss or damage be given ill wntmg to the carrier or his agent cry; ereepuon.
at the port of discharge before or at the time of the removal of the
zoods into the custody of the person entitled to deli very thereof~nder the contract of carriage, such removal shall be prima facie
evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in
the bill of lading, If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice ~~n~~ !:ar~~:"n
must be given within three days of the delivery.
Said notice of loss or damage may be endorsed upon the receipt
for the goods given by the person taking delivery thereof.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods Exception.
has at the time of their receipt been the subject of joint surveyor
inspection.
In anv event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from Failure to brine suit;
all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought dis charge oClia bility.
within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered: Provided, That if a notice of ~~;o~[ ShiPper.
loss or damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as pro-
vided for in this section, that fact shalJ not affect Or prejudice the
right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery
of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. . .
In the case of any actual Or apprehended loss or darnaae the ~[un~e1 nJ;h ts or I ~'
'- apec tma etc. , goods, 10
carrier and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each case 01 loss.
other for inspecting and tallyin g the goods. .. . .. . .
(7) After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by lad~~,Pped oill o[
the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier to the shipper shall, if .
the shipper s~ demands, be a "shipped" bill of lading: Provided, tu~~~i~~tion or, ror
That If the shipper shall have previously taken up any document of document oCtitle previ-
titl to h d h h 11 d ously taken u p etcI e sUC goo s, e s a surren er the same as against the issu e ' .
of the "shippe~" bill of lading, but at the option of the carrier such
document of title may be noted at the port of sh ipment by the car-
rrer, master, or agent WIth the name or names of the ship or ships
upon which the goods have been shipped and the date or dates of
shipment, and when so noted the same. shall for the purpose of this
section be deemed to constitute a "shipped" bill of ladinz.
(8) Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract ot carriaze Co vena0,t reli e\'"in~
1" · h . h hi f I' b 'l' e [rom Itabilt ty ror neglt-re Ievmg t e carrier or t e S I p rom ia 1 ity for loss or damage to gence, NC. , void.
or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault or
failure in the duties and obligations provided in this sect ion ' or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provid~~ in this Act, shall
be null and void and of no effect, A. benefit of insurance ill favor
of the carrier or sim ilar clause shall be deemed to be a clause reliev-
" , ,
mg the carrier from liability.
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RIGHTS J,.)iO DDrC:-i!TIES
Duru en of prooL
SEC. 4. (1) Neither the carrier nor the ship shal l be liable for loss
or dam az e urisinu or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused
bv want -of due dil izence on the part of the carrier to make the ship
seaworthv. and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equip ped ,
and supplIed , and to make. the holds, refrigerating and cool ~ham­
bers , and all other parts or the ship in which goods a re carried fit
and 'safe for their reception, carriage, and preservation in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 3. Whenever loss
or damuze has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving
the eser~ise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other persons
claimina exemption under this sect ion.
Exemc u on (rorn lb· (2) :Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for lossbil it y irom r,O,,,glll' teJ
causes, or damage arising or resulting from-
(a) A ct, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the
servants or the carrier in the navigation or in the management of
the ship ;
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the ca r -
ri er ;
(c) P er-ils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other na vig uble
waters;
(d ) A ct of God;
(e) Act of war;
(f ) Act of public enemies;
(g ) Arrest or restraint. of princes, rulers, or people, or seizure
under legal process ;
(h ) Quarantine restrictions;
( i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his
azent or representative;
~ (j ) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labor from
Pm tnsc whatever cause, whether partial or general: Provided, that nothing
L' ~rrier's own acts, h erei ' 1 1 1" fierein contained s ia I be construed to re ieve a carr-ier rom respon-
sibility for the carrier's own acts;
(k) Riots and civil commotions ;
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea ;
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage
arising from inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods;
(n) Insufficiency of packing;
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks;
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence; and
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity
of the carrier and without the fault or neglect of the agents or serv-
ants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person
claiming the benefit of th is exception to show that neither the actual
fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents
or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
(3) The shipper shall not be responsible for loss or damage sus-
tained by the carr ier or the ship arising or resulting from any cause
with out th e act , fault, or neglect of the shipper, his agents, or his
serv an ts .
Cert ai n d evia tion' (1-) Any deviation in sav ing or .at t.emp tin O" to sa ve life or prop-~~~ ~~~~ra~~~8ch or er ty at sea, or any reasonable devia tion shall not be deemed to be
an infringement Or breach of this Act or of the cont ract of car ri age,
and th e carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting
Pru ovi.o , bl d ' therefrom: Provided, how ever , That if the deviation is ~or the pur-nressona e evru- f 1 di nl di . h 11 .tio n . pose 0 oa m g or u oa mg cargo or passengers It s a, prima
fa cie , be regarded as unreasonable.
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Promso .
T erms to be em -
bodied in nonnegoua-
ab le receipt.
( "- ) Neither the carrier nor the shin "hall in any event be or . ..\:~"llnt oi carrier's.~ .i..' . 1 - 1 -. " . liao ili ry for loss.
become liable for any toss or damage to or in connection with the
transportation of zoods in an amount exceeding $500 per package
lawful money or the United St:l;tes, or ~n case of goods not shipped
in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that
sum in other cur rency. unless the nature and value of such goods
ha ve been declared by 'the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the bill of
ladinz, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be conclusive
on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, ma ster, or agent of the carrier , ,,:.~i;~~~~n i:'alinlll ::1
and the shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in
this paragruph mav be fixed: Provided, That such maximum shall Pr rnnso,
not be less than the figure above named. In no event shall the Low es t maximum.
carrier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually
sustained.
Neither the carrier nor the sill p shall be responsible in any event ~I L"tatemenls: e.:...v;
for loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of ot.
the zoods if the nature or value thereof has been knowingly and
frauClulently misstated by the shipper in the bill of lading. "
(6) Goods of an inflammable, explosive, or dangerous nature to Irularu rna ble. e 1 c .
the shipment whereof the carrier, master or agent of the carrier, gDOOS.
has not consented with knowledge of their nature and character,
may at any time before discharge be landed at any place or destroyed 'i:!n~e:,~r:'ent. disp osi-
or rendered innocuous by the carrier without compensation, and the
shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damages and expenses
directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from such shipment.
If any such good s shipped with such knowledge and consent shall
become a danger to the ship or cargo, they may in like manner be
landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered i.nnocuous by the
carri er without liability on the part of the carrier except to general
average, if any.
SURRENDER OF RIGHTS A~l) I:MMUNITIES AND I){CREASE OF RESPONSI-
BILITIES AND LIA..BILITIES
SEC. 5. A carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in whole or in Surrender. DC riuhts..
11 f hi . h d'" . . . eLC.. and ia creuse otpart a or anv 0 IS ng ts an immunities or to increase any of responsrbllines, ere,
his responsibilities and liabilities under this Act, provided such
surrender or increase shall be embodied in the bill of lading issued
to the shipper.
The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to charter .\C 1 not a pplica ble to
• char ter partIes.parties; but if bills of lading are issued in the case of a ship under
a charter party, they shall comply with the terms of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be held to prevent the insertion in a bill
of lading of any lawful provision regarding general average.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS Special condi tions.
SEC. 6. Notwithstandinz the provisions of the precedin tr sections Acreemeuts he1We,)r.
• b 4 • 0 . ' ~:t rrI~r end :i0 1P l---e( pe~ ·
a carrier, master ?r agent of the carner, and a shi pper shall, III m u ted .
regard to any pnrticular goods be at liberty to enter into any aizree-
ment in an v terms as to the responsibility and liahilitv of th~ carrier
for such goods, and as to the rights and "imm unities o"f the carrier in
respect of such goods, or his obligation as to seaworthiness (so far
as the stipulation regarding seaworthiness is not contrary to public
policy), or the care or diligence of his ?ervants or agents in regard
to the loading, handling, stowage, carnage, custody, care, and dis-
charze of the coeds carried bv sea: Provided. That in this case no
bill ~f lading has been or shall be issued and that the terms agreed
shall be embodied in a receipt which shall be a nonnegotiable
document and shall be marked as such.
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Anv :l!!reement SO entered into shall have full legal effect: Pro-
vided:That this section shall not apply to ordinary commercial
shipments made in the ordinary course of trade but only to other
shipments where the character or condition .o~ the proper~y' to be
carried or the circumstances. terms. and conditions under which the
carriage is to be performed are such as reasonably to justify a
special azreement,
SE.c. 7.- Nothin« contained in this Act shall prevent a carrier or a
shipper from entering~ into any agreement,. stipulation, .co,!!-c.liLionz
reservation, or exemption as to the responsibility and linbility or
the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in connection
with the custodv and care and handling of goods prior to the loading
on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which the
goods are carried by sea.
SE.c. 8. The. provisions of this Act shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the carrier under the provisions of the Shipping Act,
1916, or under the provisions of sections 4281 to 4289, inclusive, of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, or of any amendments
thereto; or under the provisions of any other enactment for the time
being in force relating to. the limitation of the liability of the owners
of seagoing vessels.
TITLE II
A.ni., p. 1211.
Dtscrimination be- SECTION 9, Xothing contained in this Act shall be construed astween cornpetrng ship-
pers !l01 permitted. permitting a common carrier by water to discriminate between com-
peting shippe.rs similarly placed in time and circumstances, either
(a) with respect to their right to demand and receive bills of lading
subject to the provisions of this Act; or (b) when issuing such bills
of lading, either in the surrender of any of the carrier's rights and
immunities or in the increase. of any of the carrier's responsibilities
and liabilities pursuant to section 5, title I, of this Act; or (c) in any
other way prohibited by the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.
Through bills of SEC. 10. Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act is herebvlading issued by rail- "
road carriers. amended by adding the following proviso at the. end of paragraph 4:
u.\~n.lc., ~l. 2'22~: 4!l8: thereof: "Provided, Iunoeuer, That insofar as any bill of lading
to Sl~~" ~~~~"~e subject authorized hereunder relates to the carriage of goods by sea, such
bill of lading shall be subject to the. provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act."
is W~~~~",T::"e':f ~reiga~ SEC. 11. Where under the customs of any trade the weight of any
cepted by third parry. bulk cargo inserted in the bill of lading is a weight ascertained or
accepted by a third party other than the carrier or the shi pper, and
the fact that the weight is so ascertained or accepted is stated in the
bill of lading, then, notwithstanding anything in this Act, the bill
of lading shall not be deemed to be prima facie evidence against the
carrier of the receipt of goods of the weight so inserted in the bill
of lading, and the accuracy thereof at the time of shipment shall
not be deemed to have been guaranteed by the shipper.
EXisting provisions SEC. 12. Nothinz in this Act shall be. construed as superseding any
nOt sIfected....... ....... -
Vol. 27. p. 445. part of the Act entitled "An Act relating to navigation of vessels,
G. s. c.. p. 1999. bills of lading, and to certain obligations, duties, and rights in con-
nection with the. carriage of property", approved February 13, 1893,
or of anv other law which would be applicable in the absence of this
Act, insofar as they relate to the duties, responsibilities, and liabili-
ties of the ship or carrier prior to the time when the goods are loaded
on or after the time they are discharged from the ship.
~~~·l~·§~~tes" de- SEC. 13. This Act shall apply to all contracts for carriage of goods
tined. by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade. As
used in this Act the term "United States" includes its districts, terri-
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tories, and possessions: Prouided, houieuer, That the Philippine rc~~~o.by Pbiiippine
Lezislature mav bv law exclude Its application to transportation to Leqisiuture.
or from Darts of the Philippine Islands. The term ;' foreig:n trade" "Foreign trade" de-
meu ns th~ transportation.of goods between th~ po~ts o~ the United dned. ,
States and ports of foreign countries. Nothing in this Act shall et;>.o~~~,.c coastwtse,
be held to apply to contracts for carriage ?f goods by sea between
any port of the "(;nited States or its possessions, and any other port
of the l-nited States or its passess ions : Provided, however, That any Application o( .\ c< to
. bills ot lactio~ issued for,bill of ludinz or similar document of title which IS evidence of a by agreement,
contract for the carriage or goods by sea between such ports: con-
taininz an express statement that it shall be subject to the pro-
visions of this Act, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject
hereto bv the express provisions of this Act : Provided f7hrther, That Foreign trade : st a te-
o • men< required.
every bill of lading or similar document of title which IS evidence of
a contract for the carriage of goods by sea from ports of the United
States, in foreign trade, shall contain a statement that it shall have
effect subject to the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 14. Upon the certification of the Secretary of Commerce that Suspen;;ion ot Title r
h f . flU ' d S " . . . h by Presidential proc-t. e oreign commerce 0 the nite tates in ItS competition WIt lamation.
that of foreign nations is prejudiced by the provisions, or any of
them: of title I of this Act, or by the laws of any foreign country
or countries relating to the carriage of goods by sea, the President
of the United States may, from time to time, by .p roclamation, sus-
pend any or all provisions of title I of this Act for such periods
of time o,r indefinitely as m~y be designated in the proclaID?-tion. . .
The President may at any time rescind such suspension of title I m~~~s.'Hon ot proela-
hereof, and any provisions thereof which may have been suspended
shall thereby be reinstated and again apply to contracts thereafter
made for the carriage of goods by sea. Any proclamation of sus- Effective date.
pension or rescission of any such suspension shall take effect on a
date named therein. which date shall be not less than ten days from
the issue of the proclamation. •
.~~y cOfntlr~ctAfor thffe c~rriudge of goods by. seda, shubjec.tlto the pro- in;i~g1~~~;ro~~<V'5duro
VISIons 0 t lIS ct, e ective urmg any .perro w en tit e I hereof, .
or any part thereof, is suspended, shall be subject to all provisions
of law now or hereafter applicable to that part of title I which may
have thus been suspended.
SEC. 15. This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date of Effective date,
its approval; but nothing in this Act shall apply during a period
not to exceed one year following its approval to any contract for the
carriage of goods by sea, made before the date on which this Act
is approved, nor to any bill of ladin&, or similar document of title
issued, whether before or after such date of approval in pursuance
of any such contract as aforesaid.
SEC. 16. This Act may be cited as the "Carriage of Goods bv Sea Citation o( Act.
Act." -
Approved, April 16, 1936.
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APPENDIX 2
(Trall81aUon)
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO BILLS OF LADING, SIGNED
AT BRUSSELS, AUGUST 25, 1924
The President of the German Republic, the President of the ,',Argen-
tine Republic, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of
the Republic of Chile, the President of the Republic of Cuba, His
Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland, His Majesty the King of
Spain, the Chief of the Estonian State, the President of the United
States of America, the President of the Republic of Finland, the Presi-
dent of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Possessions
Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Serene Highness the Regent
of the Kingdom of Hungary, His Majesty the King of Italy, His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of
Latvia, the President of the Republic of Mexico, His Majesty the
King of Norway, Her'Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, the
President of the Republic of Peru, the President of the Republic of
Poland, the President of the Portuguese Republic, His Majesty the
King of Rumania, His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, His Majesty the King of Sweden and the President of the
Republic of Uruguay,
Having recognized the utility of laying down in common accord
certain uniform rules relating to bills of lading, have decided to con-
clude a Convention to that effect and have designated as their Pleni-
potentiaries, namely:
Contracting Pow-
ers.
PlenipotentiarIes.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC:
His Excellency Mr. von Keller, Minister of Germany at Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS:
Mr. L. Franck, Minister of Colonies, President of the Interna-
tional Maritime Committee;
Mr. A. Le Jeune, Senator, Vice President of the International •
Maritime Committee;
Mr. F. Bohr, Doctor of Law, Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Maritime Committee; Professor at the University of
Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE:
His Excellency Mr. Armando Quezada, Minister of Chile at
Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF DENMARK AND ICELAND:
95
TREA'l'IES
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SPAIN:
His Excellency the Marquis of Villalobar and Guimarey, Am-
bassador of Spain at Brussels.
CHIEF OF THE ESTONIAN STATE:
His Excellency Mr. Pusta, Minister of Estonia at Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF Tfi:E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
His Excellency Mr. William Phillips, Ambassador of the United
States of America at Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:
His Excellency Mr. M. Herbette, Ambassador of France at
Brussels.
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS BEYOND THE
SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA:
His Excellency the Right Honorable Sir George Grahame,
G. C. V. 0 ., K. C. M. G.. Ambassador of His Britannic
Majesty at Brussels.
HIS SERENE HIGHNESS THE REGENT OF THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY:
Count Olivier Woracziczky, Baron of Pabienitz, Charge d'Affaires
of Hungary at Brussels.
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY:
Mr. J. Daneo, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Italy at Brussels.
HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN:
His Excellency Mr. M. Adatci, Ambassador of Japan at
Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA:
THE PRESIDE;.J.....T OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF NORWAY:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU:
THE PRESIDENT OF TllE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AND THE FREE CITY OF
DANZIG:
His Excellency Count Jean Szembek, Minister of Poland at
Brussels.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF RUMANIA:
His Excellency Mr. Henry Catargi, Minister of Rumania at
Brussels.
HIS MAJESTY THE KINO OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES:
Messrs. Straznicky and Verona.
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SWEDEN:
THE PRESIDENT OF THl!: REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY:
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Who, duly authorized therefor, have agreed on the following:
ARTICLE 1
In this convention the following words are employed with the
meanings set out below:
(a) "Carrier" includes the owner of the vessel or the charterer who
enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper. .'
(b) "Contract of carriage" applies only to contracts of carriage
covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, insofar
as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea; it also
applies to any bill of lading or any similar document as aforesaid
issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment at
which such instrument regulates the relations between a carrier and
a holder of the same.
. (c) "Goods" includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of
every kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo which by the
contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried.
(d) "Ship" means any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea.
(e) "Carriage of goods" covers the period. from the time when the
.goods are loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship.
ARTICLE 2
Subject to the provisions of Article 6 under every contract of
carriage of goods by sea the carrier, in relation to the loading, han-
dling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of such goods
shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities, and entitled to
the rights and immunities hereinafter set forth.
ARTICLE 3
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the
voyage to exercise due diligence to:-
(a) Make the ship seaworthy;
(b) Properly man, equip, and supply the ship;
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other
parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their
reception, carriage, and preservation.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article 4 the carrier shall properly
and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge
the goods carried. •
3. After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the master
or agent of the carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the
shipper a bill of lading showing among other things:
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the
same are furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of such
goods starts, provided such marks are stamped or otherwise shown
clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or on the cases or coverings in
which such goods are contained, in such a manner as should ordinarily
remain legible until the end of the voyage;
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or
weight, as the case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper j
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(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods;
Provided that no carrier, master, or agent of the carrier shall be
bound to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, quan-
tity, or weight which he has reasonable grounds for suspecting not
accurately to represent the goods actually received or which he has
had no reasonable means of checking.
4. Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt
by the carrier of the goods as therein described in accordance with
paragraph 3 (a), (b), and (c).
5. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier
the accuracy at the time of shipment of the marks, number, quantity,
and weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper shall indemnify the
carrier against all loss, damages, and expenses arising or resulting
from inaccuracies in such particulars. The right of the carrier to
such indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility and liability
under the contract of carriage to any person other than the shipper.
6. Unless notioe of loss or damage and the general nature of such
loss or damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the
port of discharge before or at the time of the removal of the goods into
the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the con-
tract of carriage, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the
delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading.
If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice must be given within
three days of the delivery.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has
at the time of their receipt been the subject of joint surveyor in-
spection.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one
year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should
have been delivered.
In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier
and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for
inspecting and tallying the goods.
7. After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the
carrier, master, or agent of the carrier to the shipper shall, if the shipper
so demands, be a "shipped" bill of lading, provided that if the shipper
shall have previously taken up any document of title to such goods, he
shall surrender the same as against the issue of the "shipped" bill of
lading. At the option of the carrier such document of title may be
noted at the port of shipment by the carrier, master, or agent with the
name or names of the ship or ships upon which the goods have been
shipped and the date or dates of shipment, and when so noted, if it
shows the particulars mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 3, it shall
for the purpose of this article be deemed to constitute a "shipped" bill
of lading.
8. Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage
relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or
in connection with goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in
the duties and obligations provided in this article, or lessening such
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liability otherwise than as provided in this convention, shall be null and
void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance in favor of the carrier or
similar clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from
liability.
ARTICLE 4
1. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage
arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due
diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy and to
secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped, and supplied and
to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts
of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception,
carriage, and preservation in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1 of Article 3. Whenever loss or damage has resulted from un-
seaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall
be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this article.
2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or
damage arising or resulting from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the
servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the
ship;
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier;
(c) Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable
waters;
(d) Act of God;
(e) Act of war;
(f) Act of public enemies;
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers, or people or seizure under
legal process;
(h) Quarantine restrictions;
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent,
or representative;
G) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labor from
whatever cause, whether partial or general;
(k) Riots and civil commotions;
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea;
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising
from inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods:
(n) Insufficiency of packing;
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks;
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence;
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of
the carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants
of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming
the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or
privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants
of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
3. The shipper shall not be responsible for loss or damage sustained,
by the carrier or the ship arising or resulting from any cause without
the act, fault, or neglect of the shipper, his agents, or his servants.
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4. Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property
at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an in-
fringement or breach of this convention or of the contract of carriage,
and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting
therefrom.
5. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an
amount exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or unit or the
equivalent of that sum in other currency unless the nature and value
of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment
and inserted in the bill of lading.
This declaration if embodied in the bill of 'lading shall be prima
facie evidence but shall not be binding or conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier
and the shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in
this paragraph may be fixed, provided that such maximum shall not
be less than the figure above named.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for
loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods if the nature or value
thereof has been knowingly misstated by the shipper in the bill of
lading.
6. Goods of an inflammable, explosive, or dangerous nature to the
shipment whereof the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier has not
consented with knowledge of their nature and character may at any
time before discharge be landed at any place or destroyed or rendered
innocuous by the carrier without compensation, and the shipper of
such goods shall be liable for all damages and expenses directly or
indirectly arising out of or resulting from such shipment. If any
such goods shipped with such knowledge and consent shall become a
danger to the ship or cargo, they may in like manner be landed at any
place or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier without
liability on the part of the carrier except to general average, if any.
ARTICLE 5
A carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in whole or in part all or
any of his rights and immunities, or to increase any of his responsi-
bilities and liabilities under this convention provided such surrender
or increase shall be embodied in the bill of lading issued to the shipper.
The provisions of this convention shall not be applicable to charter
parties, but if bills of lading are issued in the case of a ship under a
charter-party they shall comply with the terms of this convention.
Nothing in these rules shall be held to prevent the insertion in a bill
of lading of any lawful provision regarding general average.
ARTICLE 6
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, a carrier,
master, or agent of the carrier and a shipper shall in 'regard to any
particular goods be at liberty to enter into any agreement in any
terms as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier for such
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goods, and as to the rights and immunities of the carrier in respect
of such goods, or concerning his obligation as to seaworthiness so far
as this stipulation is not contrary to public policy, or concerning the
care or diligence of his servants or agen ts in regard to the loading,
handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of the goods
carried by sea, provided that in this case no bill of lading has been or
shall be issued and that the terms agreed shall be embodied in a re-
ceipt which shall be a nonnegotiable document and shall be marked
as such.
Any agreement so entered into shall have full legal effect:
Provided that this article shall not apply to ordinary commercial
shipments made in the ordinary course of trade, but only to other
shipments where the character or condition of the property to be
carried or the circumstances, terms, and conditions under which the
carriage is to be performed are such as reasonably to justify a special
agreement.
Proeiso,
Exceptions.
ARTICLE 7
"
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from
entering into any agreement, stipulation, condition, reservation, or
exemption as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the
ship for the loss or damage to, or in connection with, the custody and
care and handling of goods prior to the loading on, and subsequent to
the discharge from, the ship on which the goods are carried by sea.
ARTICLE 8
The provisions of this convention shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the carrier under any statute for the time being in
force relating to the limitation of the liability of owners of seagoing
vessels,
ARTICLE 9
The monetary units mentioned in this convention are to be taken
to be gold value.
Those contracting states in which the pound sterling is not a mone-
tary unit reserve to themselves the right of translating the sums
indicated in this convention in terms of pound sterling into terms of
their own monetary system in round figures.
The national laws may reserve to the debtor the right of discharging
his debt in national currency according to the rate of exchange pre-
vailing on the day of the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge of
the goods concerned.
ARTICLE 10
The provisions of this convention shall apply to all bills of lading
issued in any of the contracting States.
ARTICLE 11
After an interval of not more than two years from the day on which
the convention is signed, the Belgian Government shall place itself
in communication with the governments of the high contracting
101
Liability (or goons
prior to loading; alt er
dlscbarge from shlp,
Rlgbts and obliga-
tions under statutes
resp ecting liability or
owners.
Monetary u nits.
Applicati on or con-
vention prov isions .
Communication hy
Dclgi~11 Gov ernment
w ith guver nments pre-
pared to ra t ify.
Ratlflrat.lons to be
deposited Ilt Brussels;
date.
First deposit of ratI-
fications.
Subsequent de-
posit s.
Trnnsmlttal,'by Bel-
gian Goveram ent , of
certlficd copy of pro-
Des-verbal and instru-
ments of ratification
to signatory, ete .,
powers.
Accessions by non-
signatory States.
Exclusion of domin-
ions , ' colonies, ete .,
from provisions.
Separate aceesstons.
Denunciatlon.
Eflective dates.
parties which have declared themselves prepared to ratify the con-
vention, with a view to deciding whether it shall be put into force.
The ratifications shall be deposited at Brussels at a date to be fixed
by agreement among the said governments. The first deposit of
ratifications shall be recorded in a proces-verbal signed by the repre-
sentatives of the powers which take part therein and by the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means
of a written notification, addressed to the Belgian Government and
accompanied by the instrument of ratification.
A duly certified copy of the proces-verbal relating to the first
deposit of ratifications, of the notifications referred to in the previous
paragraph, and also 0:& the instruments of ratification accompanying
them, shall be immediately sent by the Belgian Government through
the diplomatic channel to the powers who have signed this convention
or who have acceded to it. In the cases contemplated in the preceding
paragraph the said Government shall inform them at the same time
of the date on which it received the notification.
ARTICLE 12
Nonsignatory States may accede to the present convention whether
or not they have been represented at the International Conference at
Brussels.
A State which desires to accede shall notify its intention in writing
to the Belgian Government, forwarding to it the document of acces-
sion, which shill be deposited in the archives of the said Government.
The Belgian Government shall immediately forward to all the
States which have signed or acceded to the convention a duly certified
copy of the notification and of the act of accession, mentioning the
date Oil which it received the notification.
ARTICLE 13
The high contracting parties may at the time of signature, ratifica-
tion, or accession 'declare that their acceptance of the present conven-
tion does not, include any or all of the self-governing dominions, or of
the colonies, overseas possessions, protectorates, or territories under
their sovereignty or authority, and they may subsequently accede
separately on behalf of any self-governing dominion, colony, overseas
possession, protectorate, or territory excluded in their declaration.
They may also denounce the convention separately in accordance
with its provisions in respect of any self-governing dominion, or any
colony, overseas possession, protectorate, or territory under their
sovereignty or authority.
ARTICLE 14
The present convention shall take effect, in the case of the States
which have taken part in the first deposit of ratifications, one year
after the date of the proces-verbal recording such deposit. As respects
the States which ratify subsequently or which accede, and also in
cases in which the convention is subsequently put into effect in
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accordance with Article 13, it shall take effect six months after the
notifications specified in paragraph 2 of Article 11, and paragraph 2
of Article 12, have been received by the Belgian Government.
ARTICLE 15
In the event of one of the contracting States wishing to denounce
the present convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing
to the Belgian Government, which shall immediately communicate
a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other States inform-
ing them of the date on which it was received.
The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the State which
made the notification, and on the expiry of one year after the notifica-
tion has reached the Belgian Government.
ARTICLE 16
Anyone of the contracting States shall have the right to call for a
fresh conference with a view to considering possible amendments.
A State which would exercise this right should notify its intention
to the other States through the Belgian Government, which would
make arrangements for convening the conference.
Done at Brussels, in a single copy, August 25, 1924.
For Germany:
KELLER.
For the Argentine Republic:
For Belgium:
LOUIS FRANCK.
ALBERT LE JEUNE.
SOHR.
For ouu.
ARMANDO QUEZADA.
For the Republic of Cuba:
For Denmark:
For Spain:
The Marquis of VILLALOBAR.
For Estonia:
PUSTA.
For the United States of America:
WILLIAM PHILLIPS.
For Finland:
For France:
MAURICE HERBETTE.
For Great Britain:
GEORGE GRAHAME.
For Hungary:
WORACZICZKY.
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For Italy:
GIULIO DANEO.
For Japan:
M. ADATCI.
Subject to the reservations formulated in the note
relative to this treaty and appended to my letter
dated August 25, 1925, to His Excellency Mr.
Emile Vandervelde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Belgium.
For Latvia:
For Mexico:
For 'Noruxuj:
For the Netherlands :
For Peru:
For Poland and the Free City oj Danzig:
SZEMBEK.
For Portugal:
For Rumania:
HENRY CATARGI.
For the Kingdom oj the'· Serbs, Croats and Slovenes:
Dr. MILORAD STRAZNICKY.
Dr. VERONA.
For Sweden:
For Uruguay:
Protocol of Signature
In proceeding to the signature of the international convention for
the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading, the under-
signed plenipotentiaries have adopted the present protocol which will
have the same validity as if the provisions thereof were inserted in the
very text of the convention to which it refers.
The high contracting parties may give effect to this convention
either by giving it the force of law or by including in their national
legislation in a form appropriate to that legislation, the rules adopted
under this convention.
They may reserve the right:
1. To prescribe that in the cases referred to in paragraph 2 (c) to
(p) of Article 4, the holder of a bill of lading shall be entitled to estab-
lish responsibility for loss or damage arising from the personal fault
of the carrier or the fault of his servants which are not covered by
paragraph (a);
2. To apply Article 6 insofar as the national coasting trade is con-
cerned to all classes of goods without .taking account of the restriction
Bet out in the last paragraph of that article.
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APPENDIX 3
PROTOCOL TO Al'1END THE INTERL"iATIONAL CONVE1'o'TION FOR THE
UNIF1CATION OF CERTAIN RULES OF LAW RELATL~G TO BILLS
OF LADING SIG;\'"ED AT BRUSSELS ON 25 AUGUST 1924 I
Signed at Brussels, 23 February 1968
The Contracting Parties,
Considering that it is desirable to amend the International Convention for the unifi-
cation of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading, signed at Brussels on 25th August
1924,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. In Article 3, paragraph 4 shall be added:
.. However, proof to the contrary shall not be admissible when the Bill of Lading
has been transferred to a third party acting in good faith ...
2. In Article 3, paragraph 6, subparagraph 4 shall be replaced by :
.. Subject to paragraph 6 bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged
from all liab ility whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one
year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered. This period
may, however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen...
3. In Article 3, after paragraph 6 shall be added the following paragraph 6 bis:
.. An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even after the
expiration of the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought within the time
allowed by the law of the Court seized of the case . However, the time allowed shall be
not less than three months, commencing from the day when the person bringing such
act ion for indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action
against himself. ..
Article 2
Article 4, paragraph S shall be deleted and replaced by the following:
(a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper
before shipment and inserted in the Bill of Lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall
in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of Frs. 10,000 per package or unit or Frs. 30
per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The total. amount recoverable shall be calculated by reference to the value of
such goods at the place: and time at which the goods are discharged from tbe ship in
accordance with the contract or should have been so discharged.
The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the commodity exchange price,
or, if there be no such price, according to the current market price , or, if there be no
commodity exchange price or current market price, by reference to the normal value of
goods of the same kind and quality.
(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as packed in
such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose
of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid
such article of transport shall be considered the package or unit.
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(d) A franc means a unit consisnng of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal
fineness 900'. The date of conversion of the sum awarded into national currencies shall
be governed by the law of the Court seized of the case.
(e) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation
of liability provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from
an act or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and
with knowledge that damage would probably result.
(I) The declaration mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, if embodied
in the Bill of Lading, shaJl be prima facie evidence, but shall not be binding or conclusive
on the carrier. .
(,;-) By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the shipper
other maximum amounts than those mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph
may be fixed, provided that no maximum amount so fixed shall be less tha.. the appropriate
maximum mentioned in that sub-paragraph.
(h) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for Joss or
damage to, or in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been knowingly
mis-stated by the shipper in the Bill of Lading.
Article 3
Between Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention shall be inserted the following Article 4 bis :
I. The defences and limits of liability provided for in ' this Convention shall apply
in any action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract
of carriage whether the action be founded in contract or in tort.
2. If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant
or agent not being an independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled
to avail himself of the defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke
under this Convention.
3. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, and such servants
and agents, shall in no case exceed the limit provided for in this Convention.
4. Nevertheless. a servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself
of the provisions of this Article, if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.
Article 4
Article 9 of the Convention shall be replaced by the following:
.. This Convention shall not affect the provisions of any international Convention
or national law governing liability for nuclear damage".
Article 5
Article 10 of the Convention shall be replaced by the following :
.. The provisions of this Convention shall apply to every Bill of Lading relating to
the carriage of goods between ports in two different States if:
(a) the Bill of Lading is issued in a contracting State.
or
(b) the carriage is from a port in a contracting State,
or
(c) the Contract contained in or evidenced by the Bill of Lad ing provides that the
rules of this Convention or legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the
contract
whatever may be the nationality of the ship , the carrier, the shipper, the consignee, or any
other interested person.
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Each contracting State shall apply the provisions of this Convention to the Bills
of Lading mentioned above.
This Article shall not prevent a Contracting State from applying the Rules of this
Convention to Bills of Lading not included in the preceding paragraphs".
Article 6
As between the Parties to this Protocol the Convention and the Protocol shall be
read and interpreted together as one single instrument.
A Party to this Protocol shall have no duty to apply. the provisions of this Protocol
to Bills of Lading issued in a State which is a Party to the Convention but which is not
2. Party to this Protocol.
Article 7
As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any of them of the Convention
in accordance with Article 15 thereof, shall not be construed in any way as a denunciation
of the Convention as amended by this Protocol.
Article 8
Any dispute between two or more Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation
or application of the Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the
date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization
of the arbitration, anyone of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court
of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
Article 9
I, Each Contracting Party may at the time of signature or rat ification orthis Frorocol
or :lccession· the reto , declare that it does not consider itseif bound bv Article S of this
?rOtoco!. The other Contracting Parties shail not be bound by this Ar.icie with respect
to any Contracting Party having made such a reservation.
2. Any Contracting Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1
may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the Belgian Government.
Article 10
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the States which have ratified the Con-
ventIOn or which have adhered thereto before the 23 February 1968, and by any State
represented at the twelfth session (1967-1968) of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime
Law.
Article 11
I. This Protocol shall be ratified.
2. Ratificat ion of this Protocol by any State which is not a Party to the Convention
shall have the effect of accession to the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Belgian Government.
Article /2
1. States, Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies
of the United Nations, not represented at the twelfth session of the Diplomatic Conference
On Maritime Law, may accede to this Protocol.
2. Accession to this Protocol shall have the effect of accession to the Convention.
3. The instruments of accession shail be deposited with the Belgian Go ..erument,
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Article 13
I. This Protocol shall come into force three months after the date of the dep c
of ten instruments of rat ification or accession , of which at least five shall have been de,
sited by States that have each a tonnage equal or superior to one million gross [QC~
tonnage.
2. For each State which ratifies this Protocol or accedes thereto after the date
deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession determining the coming into fo
such as is stipulated in § 1 of this Article, this Protocol shall come into force three man :
after the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession .
Article 14
I. Any Contracting State may denounce this Protocol by notification to the Belgi
Government.
2. This denunciation sha II have the effect of denunciation of the Convention.
3. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date on which the not:
cation has been received by the Belgian Government.
Article 15
I. Any Contracting State may ~t the time of signature, ratification or accessic
or at any time thereafter declare by wr itten notification to the Belzian Governrne:
which among the territories under its sovereignty or for whose inrernational relatiot
it is responsible, are those to which the present Protocol applies .
The Protocol shall three months after the date uf the rece ipt o f such uouficanoc ~
the Belgian Government extend to the territories named therein. but [lot before the da
of the coming into force of the Protocol in respect of such State.
2. This extension also shall apply to the Convention if the latter is not yet applicab
to those territories.
3. Any Contracting State which has made a declaration under § 1 of this Artie .
may at any time thereafter declare by notification given to the Belgian Government th:
the Protocol shall cease to extend to such territory. This denunciarion shall take effe.
one year after the date on which notification thereof has been received by the Beigia
Government; it also shall apply to the Convention.
Article 16
The Contracting Parties may give effect to this Prorocol either by giving it the for,
of law or by including in their national legislation in a form appropriate to tha t legislat ic
the rules adopted under this Protocol.
Article 17
The Belgian Government shall notify the States represented at the twelfth sessi..:
(1967-1968) of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, the acceding Stares to th
Protocol, and the Stares Parties to the Convention, of the following:
I. The signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Articles 1,
11 and 12.
2. The date on which the present Protocol will come into force in accordance wi:
Article 13.
3. The notifications with regard to the territorial application in accordance wi:
A..rticle 15.
4. The denunciarions received in accordance with Article 14.
IN Wln;ESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised, have signe
this Protocol.
DO:-O=E at Brussels, this 23rd day of February 1968, in the French and English language
both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in rr.
archives of the Belgian Government, which shall issue certified copies.
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APPENDIX 4
PROTOCOL AMENDING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES OF LAW
RELATING TO BILLS OF LADING, 25 AUGUST, 1924,
AS AMENDED BY THE PROTOCOL OF 23 FEBRUARY 1968
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE PRESENT PROTOCOL,
BEING PARTIES to the International Convention for the
unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of
lading, done at Brussels on 25th August 1924, as amended by
the Protocol to amend that Convention, done at Brussels on
23rd February 1968,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Article I
For the purpose of this Protocol, "Convention" means the
International Convention for the unification of certain
rules of law relating to bills of lading and its Protocol
of signature, done at Brussels on 25th August 1924, as
amended by the Protocol, done at Brussels on 23rd February,
1968 .
Article II
1. Article 4, paragraph 5, a) of the Convention is re-
placed by the following:
"a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship
shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or
damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount
exceeding 666.67 units of account per package or unit or
2 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the
goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher."
2. Article 4, paragraph ~, d) of the Convention is re-
placed by the following:
"d) The unit of account mentioned in this Article is the
Special Drawing Right as defined by the International
Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in sub-paragraph a)
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of this paragraph shall be converted into national cur-
rency on the date to be determined by the law of the
Court seized of the case. The value of the national
currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a
State which is a member of the Inter~ational Monetary
Fund, shall be calculated in accordance with the method
of valuation applied by the International Monetary Fund
in effect at the date in question for its operations and
transactions. The value of the national currency, in
terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a State which is
not a member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be
calculated in a manner determined by that State.
Nevertheless, a State which is not a member of the
International Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit
the application of the provisions of the preceding sentences
may, at the time of ratification of the Protocol of 1979 or
accession thereto or at any time thereafter, declare that
the limits of liability provided for in this Convention to
be applied in its territory shall be fixed as follows:
(i) in respect of the amount of 666.67 units of account
mentioned in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5 of this
Article, 10,000 monetary units;
(ii) in respect of the amount of 2 units of account men-
tioned in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5 of this ArticLe,
30 monetary units.
The monetary unit referred to in the preceding sentence
corresponds to 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal
fineness 900'. The conversion of the amounts specified in
that sentence into the national currency shall be made
according to the law of the State concerned. The calcula-
tion and the conversion mentioned in the preceding sentences
shall be made in such a manner as to express in the national
currency of that State as far as possible the same real
value for the amounts in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5 of
this Article as is expressed there in units of account .
States shall communicate to the depositary the manner
of calculation or the result of the conversion as the case
may be, when depositing an instrument of ratification of the
Protocol of 1979 or of accession thereto and whenever there
is a change in either.
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Article III
Any dispute between two or more Contracting Parties
concerning the interpretation or application of the present
Protocol, which cannot be settled through negotiation,
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbi-
tration. If within six months from the date of the request
for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the
organisation of the arbitration, anyone of those Parties
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice
by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court .
Article IV
(1) Each Contracting Party may at the time of signature or
ratification of this Protocol or of accession thereto,
declare that it does not consider itself bound by
Article III.
(2) Any Contracting Party having made a reservation in
accordance with paragraph (1) may at any time withdraw
this reserv~tion by notification to the Belgian Govern-
ment.
Article V
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the States
which have signed the Convention of 25 August 1924 or the
Protocol of 23 February 1968 or which are Parties to the
Convention .
Article VI
(1) This Protocol shall be ratified.
(2 ) Ratification of this Protocol by any State which is
not a Party to the Convention shall have the effect of
ratification of the Convention.
(3) The instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Belgian Government.
Article VII
(1) States not referred to in Article V may accede to this
Protocol.
(2) Accession to this Protocol shall have the effect of
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accession to the Convention.
(3 ) The instruments of accession shall be deposited with
the Belgian Government.
Article VIII
(1) This Protocol shall come into force three months after
the date of the deposit of five instruments of ratifi-
cation or accession.
(2) For each State which ratifies this Protocol or accedes
thereto after the fifth deposit, this Protocol shall
come into force three months after the deposit of its
instrument of ratification or accession.
Article IX
(1 )
(2)
Any Contracting Party may denounce this Protocol by
notification to the Belgian Government.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the
/date on which the notification has been received by the
Belgian Government.
Article X
(1) Each State may at the time of signature, ratification
or accession or at any time thereafter declare by
written notification to the Belgian Government which
among the territories for whose international relations
it is responsible, are those to which the present Pro-
tocol applies. The Protocol shall three months after
the date of the receipt of such notification by the
Belgian Government extend to the territories named
therein, but not before the date of the coming into
force of the Protocol in respect of such State.
(2) This extension also shall apply to the Convention if
the latter is not yet applicable to these territories.
(3) Any Contracting Party which has made a declaration
under paragraph (1) of this Article may at any time
thereafter declare by not ification given to the Belgian
Government that the Protocol shall cease to extend to
such territories . This denunciation shall take effect
one year after the date on which not ification thereof
has been received by the Belgian Government.
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Article XI
The Belgian Government shall notify the signatory and
acceding States of the following:
1. the signatures, ratifications and accessions received
in accordance with Articles V, VI and VII.
2. The date on which the present Protocol will come into
force in accordance with Article VIII.
3. the notifications with regard to the territorial appli-
cation in accordance with Article X.
4. the declarations and communications made in accordance
with Article II.
5. the declarations made in accordance with Article IV.
6. the denunciations received in accordance with Article IX.
List of sign~tories
2l.XII.1979.
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APPENDIX 5
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE CARRIAGE
OF GOODS BY SEA, 1978
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
HAVING RECOGNISED the desirability of determining by
agreement certain rules relating to the carriage of goods
by sea,
HAVE DECIDED to conclude a Convention for this purpose
and have thereto agreed as foLl ows :
PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Defini tions
In this Convention:
1 . "Carrier" means any person by whom or in whose name
a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded
with a shipper.
2. "Actual carrier" means any person to whom the per-
formance of the carriage of the goods, or of part of the
carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes
any other person to whom such performance has been entrusted.
3. "Shipper" means any person by whom or in whose name
or on whose behalf a contract of carriage of goods by sea
has been concluded with a carrier, or any person by whom or
in whose name or on whose behalf the goods are actually
delivered to the carrier in relation to the contract of
carriage by sea.
4. "Consignee" means the person entitled to take deli-
very of the goods.
5. "Goods" includes live animals; where the goods are
consolidated in a container, pallet or similar article of
transport or where they are packed, "goods" includes such
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article of transport or packaging if supplied by the
shipper.
6. "Contract of carriage by sea" means any contract
whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of freight
to carry goods by sea from one port to another; however, a
contract which involves carriage by sea and also carriage
by some other means is deemed to be a contract of carriage
by sea for the purposes of this Convention only in so far as
it relates to the carriage by sea.
7 . "Bill of lading" means a document which evidences a
contract of carriage by sea and the taking over or loading
of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier under-
takes to deliver the goods against surrender of the
document. A provision in the document that the goods are to
be delivered to the order of a named person, or to order, or
to bearer, constitutes such an undertaking .
8. "Writing" includes , i n t er alia , telegram and telex.
Article 2
Scope of application
1. The provisions of this Convention are applicable to
all contracts of carrriage by sea between two different
States, if:
(a) the port of loading as provided for in the contract
of carriage by sea is located in a Contracting
State, or
(b) the port of discharge as provided for in the
contract of carriage by sea is located in a Con-
tracting State, or
(c) one of the optional ports of discharge provided for
in the contract of carriage by sea is the actual
port of discharge and such port is located in a
Contracting State, or
(d) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the
contract of carriage by sea is issued in a Con-
tracting State, or
(e ) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the
contract of carriage by sea provides that the
provisions of this Convention or the legislation of
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any State giving effect to them are to govern the
contract.
2. The provisions of this Convention are applicable
without regard to the nationality of the ship, the carrier,
the actual carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other
interested person.
3. The provisions of this Convention are not applicable
to charter-parties. However, where a bill of lading is
issued pursuant to a charter-party, the provi sions of the
Convention apply to such a bill of lading if it governs the
relation between the carrier and the holder of the bill of
lading, not being the charterer.
4. If a contract provides for future carriage of goods
in a s e r i es of shipments during an agreed period, the
provisions of this Convention apply to each shipment. How-
ever, where a shipment is made under a charter-part y, the
provisions of paragraph 3 of this article appl y.
Article 3
Interpretation of the Convention
In the interpretation and application of the provisions
of this Convention regard shall be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity.
PART II. LIAfiILITY OF THE CARRIER
Article 4
Period of responsibility
1. The responsibility of the carrier for the goods
unde~ this Convention covers the period during which the
carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading,
during the carriage and at the port of discharge.
2 . For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, the
carrier is deemed to be ln charge of the goods
(a) from the time he has taken over the goods from:
(i) the shipper, or a person acting on his behalf ;
or
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( i i ) an authority or other third party to whom, pur-
suan t to law or regulations applicable at the
port of loading, the goods must be handed over
fer the shipment;
(b) until the time he has delivered the goods:
(i) by handing over the goods to the consignee; or
( i i) in cases where the consignee does not receive
the goods from the carrier, by placing them at
the disposal of the consignee in accordance
with the contract or with the law or with the
us ag e of the particular trade, applicable at
the port of discharge; or
( i i i ) by handing over the goods to an authority or
other third party to whom, pursuant to law or
regulations applicable at the port of discharge,
the goods must be handed over .
3 . In paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, reference to
the ca r r i er or to the consignee means, in addition to the
carrier or the consignee, the servants or agents, respec-
tively of the carrier or the consignee.
Article 5
Basis of liability
1. The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of
or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery,
if the occurrenc e which caused the loss, damage or delay
took place whi l e the goods were in his charge as defined in
article 4 , unless the carrier proves that he, his servants
or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required
to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
2 . Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not
been delivered at the port of discharge provided for in the
contract of carriage by sea within the time expressly agreed
upon or, in the absence of such agreement, within the time
which it would be reasonable to require of a diligent
carrier, having regard to the circumstances of the case.
3. The person entitled to make a claim for the loss of
goods may treat the goods as lost if they have not been de-
livered as required by article 4 within 60 consecutive days
followin g the expiry of the time for delivery according to
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paragraph 2 of this article.
4. (a) The carrier is liable
(i) for loss of or damage to the g08ds or delay in
delivery caused by fire, if the claimant proves
that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the
part of the carrier, his servants or agents;
(ii) for such loss, damage or delay in delivery which
is proved by t he claimant to have resulted from
the fault or neglect of the carrier, his ser-
vants or agents, in taking all measures that
could reasonably be required to put out the fire
and avoid or mitigate its consequences.
(b ) In case of fire on board the ship affecting the
goods, if the claimant or the carrier so des ires, a
survey in accordance with shipping practices must
be held into the cause and circumstances of the
fire, and a copy of the surveyor's report shall be
made available on demand to the carrier and the
claimant.
5. With respect to live animals, the carrier i s not
liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery resulting from
any special risks inherent in that kind of carriage. If the
carrier proves that he has complied with any special i n -
structions given to him by the shipper respecting the
animals and that, in the circumstances of the case, the loss,
damage or delay in delivery could be attributed to such
risks, it is presumed that the loss, damage or delay in
delivery was so caused, unless there is proof that all or a
part of the loss , damage or delay in delivery resulted from
fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents.
6. The carrier is not liable, except in general average,
where loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from
measures to save life or from reasonable measures to save
property at sea.
7. Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier,
his servants or agents combines with another cause to pro-
duce loss, damage or delay in delivery the carrier is liable
only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in deli-
very is attributable to such fault or neglect, provided that
the carrier proves the amount of the loss , damage or delay
in delivery not attributable thereto.
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Article 6
Limits of liability
1. (a) The liability of the carrier for loss resulting
from loss of or damage to goods according to the
provisions of article 5 is limited to an amount
equivalent to 835 units of account per package or
other shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per
kilogramme of gross weight of the goods lost or
damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The liability of the carrier for delay in delivery
according to the provisions of article 5 is limited
to an amount equivalent to two and a half times the
freight payable for the goods delayed, but not
exceeding the total freight payable under the con-
tract of carriage of goods by sea.
(c) In no c~~> ~hall the aggregate liability of the
carrier, under both subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
this paragraph, exceed the limitation which would be
established under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph
for total loss of the goods with respect to which
such liability was incurred.
2. For the purpose of calculating which amount is the
higher in accordance with paragraph 1 (a ) of this article,
the following rules apply:
(a ) Where a container, pallet or similar article of
transport is used to consolidate goods, the package
or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of
lading, if issued, or otherwise in any other docu-
ment evidencing the contract of carriage by sea , as
packed in such article of transport are deemed
packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid the
goods in such article of transport are de emed one
shipping unit.
(b) In caSes where the article of transport itself has
been lost or damaged, that article of transport, if
not owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier, is
considered one separate shipping unit.
3. Unit of account means the unit of account mentioned
in article 26.
4. By agreement between the carrier and the shipper,
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limits of liability exceeding those provided for in para-
graph 1 may be fixed.
Article 7
Application to non-contractual claims
1. The defences and limits of liability provided for in
this Convention apply in any action against the carrier in
respect of loss or damage to the goods covered by the con-
tract of carriage by sea, as well as of delay in delivery
whether the action is founded in contract, in tort or
otherwise.
2. If such an action is brought against a servant or
agent of the carrier, such servant or agent, if he proves
that he acted within the scope of his employment, is entit-
led to avail himself of the defences and limits of liability
which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this Conven-
tion.
3. Except as provided in article 8, the aggregate of
the amounts recoverable from the carrier and from any persons
referred to in paragraph 2 of this article shall not exceed
the limits of liability provided for in this Convention.
Article 8
Loss of right to limit responsibility
1. The carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the
limitation of liability provided for in article 6 if it is
proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted
from an act or omission of the carrier done with the intent
to cause such loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably
result.
2. Notwithstanding the provlslons of paragraph 2 of
article 7, a servant or agent of the carrier is not entitled
to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for
In article 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay
in delivery resulted from an act or omission of such servant
or agent, done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or
delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss,
damage or delay would probably result.
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Article 9
Deck cargo
1. The carrier is entitled to carry the goods on deck
only if such carriage is in accordance with an agreement
with the shipper or with the usage of the particular trade
or is required by statutory rules or regulations.
2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the
goods shall or may be carried on deck, the carrier must
insert in the bill of lading or other document evidencing
the contract of carriage by sea a statement to that effect.
In the absence of such a statement the carrier has the bur-
den of proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has
been entered into; however, the carrier is not entitled to
invoke such an agreement against a third party, including a
consignee, who has acquired the bill of lading in good
faith.
3. Where the goods have been carried on deck contrary
to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article or where
the carrier may not under paragraph 2 of this article invoke
an agreement for carriage on deck, the carrier, notwith-
standing the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 5, is
liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as for
delay in delivery, resulting solely from the carriage on
deck, and the extent of his liability is to be determined
in accordance with the provisions of article 6 or article 8
of this Convention, as the case may be.
4 . Carriage of goods on deck contrary to express
agreement for carriage under deck is deemed to be an act or
omission of the carrier within the meaning of article 8.
Article 10
Liability of the carrier and actual carrier
1. Where the performance of the carriage or part there-
of has been entrusted to an actual carrier, whether or not
in pursuance of a liberty under the contract of carriage by
sea to do so, the carrier nevertheless remains responsible
for the entire carriage according to the provisions of this
Convention. The carrier is responsible, in relation to the
carriage performed by the actual carrier, for the acts and
omissions of the actual carrier and of his servants and
agents acting within the scope of their employment.
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2. All the provIsIons of this Convention governing the
responsibility of the carrier also apply to the responsibi-
lity of the actual carrier for the carriage performed by
him. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 or article 7 and
of paragraph 2 of article 8 apply if an action is brought
against a servant or agent of the actual carrier.
3. Any special agreement under which the carrier
assumes obligations not imposed by this Convention or waives
rights conferred by this Convention affects the actual
carrier only if agreed to by him expressly and in writing.
Whether or not the actual carrier has so agreed, the carrier
nevertheless remains bound by the obligations or waivers
resulting from such special agreement.
4. Where and to the extent that both the carrier and
the actual carrier are liable, their liability is joint and
several.
5. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the
carrier, the actual carrier and their servants and agents
shall not exceed the limits of liability provided for in
this Convention.
6. Nothing in this article shall prejudice any right of
recourse as between the carrier and the actual carrier.
Article 11
Through carriage
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of
article 10, where a contract of carriage by sea provides
explicitly that a specified part of the carriage covered by
the said contract is to be performed by a named person other
than the carrier, the contract may also provide that the
carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery
caused by an occurrence which takes place while the goods
are in the charge of the actual carrier during such part of
the carriage. Nevertheless, any stipulation limiting or
excluding such liability is without effect if no judicial
proceedings can be instituted against the actual carrier in
a court competent under paragraph 1 or 2 of article 21. The
burden of proving that any loss, damage or delay in delivery
has been caused by such an occurrence rests upon the carrier.
2. The actual carrier is responsible in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 10 for loss, damage
or delay in delivery caused by an occurrence which takes
place while the goods are in his charge.
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PART III. LIABILITY OF THE SHIPPER
Article 12
General rule
The shipper is not liable for loss sustained by the
carrier or the actual carrier, or for damage sustained by
the ship, unless such loss or damage was caused by the
fault or neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents.
Nor is any servant or agent of the shipper liable for such
loss or damage unless the loss or damage was caused by fault
or neglect on his part.
Article 13
Special rules on dangerous goods
1. The shipper must mark or label in a suitable manner
dangerous goods as dangerous.
2. Where the shipper hands over dangerous goods to the
carrier or an actual carrier, as the case may be, the
shipper must inform him of the dangerous character of the
goods and, if necessary, of the precautions to be taken. If
the shipper fails to do so and such carrier or actual carrier
does not otherwise have knowledge of their dangerous
character:
(a) the shipper is liable to the carrier and any actual
carrier for the loss resulting from the shipment of
such goods, and
(b) the goods may at any time be unloaded, destroyed or
rendered innocuous, as the circumstances may require,
without payment of compensation.
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of this article may
not be invoked by any person if during the carriage he has
taken the goods in his charge with knowledge of their
dangerous character.
4. If, in cases where the provlslons of paragraph 2,
subparagraph (b), of this article do not apply or may not be
invoked, dangerous goods become an actual danger to life or
property, they may be unloaded, destroyed or rendered
innocuous, as the circumstances may require, without pay-
ment of compensation except where there is an obligation to
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contribute in general average or where the carrier i s liable
in accordance with the provi sions of ar~icle 5 .
PART IV. TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS
Art icle 14
Issue of bill of lading
1. When the carrier or the actual carrier takes the
goods in his charge, the carrier must, on demand of the
shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading.
2. The bill of lading may be signed by a person having
authority from the carrier. A bill of lading signed by the
master of the ship carrying the goods is deemed to have
been signed on behalf of the carrier.
3. The signature on the bill of lading may be in hand-
writing, printed in facsimile, perforated, stamped, in sym-
bols, or made by any other mechanical or electronic means,
if not inconsistent with the law of the country where the
bill of lading is issued,
Article 15
Contents of bill of lading
1. The bill of lading must include, inter alia3 . the
following particulars:
(a) the general nature of the goods, the leading marks
necessary for identification of the goods , an
express statement, if applicable, as to the danger-
ous character of the goods, the number of packages
or pieces, and the weight of the goods or their
quantity otherwise expressed, all such particulars
as furnished by the shipper;
(b) the apparent condition of the goods;
(c) the name and principal place of business of the
carrier;
(d ) the name of the shipper;
(e) the consignee if named by the shipper;
(f) the port of loading under the contract of carriage
by sea and the date on which the goods were taken
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over by the carrier at the port of loading;
(g) the port of discharge under the contract of carriage
by sea;
(h) the number of originals of the bill of lading, if
more than one;
( i ) the place of issuance of the bill of lading;
( j) the signature of the carrier or a person acting on
his behalf;
Ck) the freight to the extent payable by the consignee
or other indicating that freight is payable by him;
(1) the statement referred to in paragraph 3 of
article 23;
Cm) the statement, if applicable, that the goods shall
or may be carried on deck;
Cn ) the date or the period of delivery of the goods at
the port of discharge if expressly agreed upon
between the parties; and
(0 ) any increased limit or limits of liability where
agreed in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 6.
2. After the goods have been loaded on board, if the
shipper so demands, the carrier must issue to the shipper
a "shipped" bill of lading which, in additicn to the parti-
culars required under paragraph 1 of this article, must
state that the goods are on board a named ship or ships, and
the date or dates of loading. If the carrier has previously
issued to the shipper a bill of lading or other document of
title with respect to any of such goods, on request of the
carrier, the shipper must surrender such document in
exchange for a "shipped" bill of lading . The carrier may
amend any previously issued document in order to meet the
shipper r s demand for a "shipped" bill of lading if, as
amended, such document includes all the information required
to be contained in a "shipped" bill of lading.
3. The absence in the bill of lading of one or more
particulars referred to in this article does not affect the
legal character of the document as a bill of lading provided
that it nevertheless meets the requirements set out in
paragraph 7 of article 1.
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Article 16
Bills of lading: reservations
and evidentiary effect
1 . If the bill of lading conta ins particulars concerning
the general nature, leading marks, n~~ber of packages or
pieces, weight or quantity of the goods which the carrier or
other person issuing the bill of lading on his behalf knows
or had reasonable grounds to suspect do not accurately re-
present the goods actually taken over or, where a "shipped"
bill of lading is issued, loaded, or if he had no reasonable
means of checking such particulars, the carrier or such
other person must insert in the bill of lading a reservation
speci f ying these inaccuracies, grounds of suspicion or the
absence of reasonable means of checking.
2. If the carrier or other person issuing the bill of
lading on his behalf fails to note on the bill of lading
the apparent condition of the goods, he is deemed to have
noted on the bill of lading that the goods were in apparent
good condition.
3 . Except for particulars in respect of which and to
the extent to which a reservation permitted under paragraph
1 of this article has been entered:
(a) the bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the
taking over or, where a "shipped" bill of lading
is issued; loading, by the carrier of the goods
as described in the bill of lading; and
(b ) proof to the contrary by the carrier is not ad-
missible if the bill of lading has been trans-
ferred to a third party, including a consignee,
who in good faith has acted in reliance on the
description of the goods therein.
4. A bill of lading which does not, as provided in
paragraph 1, subparagraph (k) of article 15, set forth the
freight or otherwise indicate that freight is payable by
the consignee or does not set forth demurrage incurred at
the port of loading payable by the consignee, is prima
facie evidence that no frieght or such demurrage is payable
by him. However, proof to the contrary by the carrier is
not admi ssible when the bill of lading has been transferred
to a third party, i nc l udi ng a consignee, who in good faith
has acted in reliance on the absence in the bill of lading
of any such indication.
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Ar~icle 17
Guarantees by the shipper
1. The shipper is deemed to have guaranteed to the
carrier the accuracy of particulars relating to the general
nature of the goods, their marks, number, weight and quanti-
ty as furnished by him for insertion in the bill of lading.
The shipper must indemnify the carrier against the loss re-
sulting from inaccuracies in such particulars. The shipper
remains liable even if the bill of lading has been trans-
ferred by him. The right of the carrier to such indemnity
in no way limits his liability under the contract of carriage
by sea to any person other than the shipper.
2. Any letter of guarantee or agreement by which the
shipper undertakes to indemnify the carrier against loss re-
sulting from the issuance of the bill of lading by the
carrier, or by a person acting on his behalf, without enter-
ing a reservation relating to particulars furnished by the·
shipper for insertion in the bill of lading, or to the
apparent condition of the goods, is void and of no effect as
against any third party, including a consignee, to whom the
bill of lading has been transferred.
3. Such letter of guarantee or agreement is valid as
against the shipper unless the carrier or the person acting
on his behalf, by omitting the reservation referred to in
paragraph 2 of this article, intends to defraud a third
party, including a consignee, who acts in reliance on the
description of the goods in the bill of lading. In the
latter case, if the reservation omitted relates to particu-
lars furnished by the shipper for insertion in the bill of
lading, the carrier has no right of indemnity from the
shipper pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article.
4. In the case of intended fraud referred to in para-
graph 3 of this article the carrier is liable, without the
benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in this
Convention, for the loss incurred by a third party, including
a consignee, because he has acted in reliance on the des-
cription of the goods in the bill of lading.
Article 18
Documents other than bills of lading
Where a carrier issues a document other than a bill of
lading to evidence the receipt of the goods to be carried,
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such a document is pr~ma faci e evidence of the conclusion of
the contract of carriage by sea and the taking over by the
carrier of the goods as therein described.
PART V. CLAIMS AND ACTIONS
Article 19
Notice of loss, damage or delay
1. Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the
general nature of such loss or damage, is given in writing
by the consignee to the carrier not later than the working
day after the day when the goods were handed over to the
consignee, such handing over is prima faci e evidence of the
delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the
document of transport or, if no such document has been
issued, in good condition.
2. Where the loss or damage is not apparent , the provi -
sions of paragraph 1 of this article apply correspondingly
if notice in writing is not given within 15 consecutive days
after the day when the goods were handed over to the
consignee.
3. If the state of the goods at the time they were
handed over to the consignee has been the subject of a joint
surveyor inspection by the parties, notice in writing need
not be given of loss or damage ascertained during such survey
or inspection.
4. In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or
damage the carrier and the consignee must give all reasonable
facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the
goods.
5 . No compensation shall be payable for loss resulting
from delay in delivery unless a notice has been gi ven in
writing to the carrier within 60 consecutive davs after the
day when the goods were handed over to the consignee.
6. If the goods have been delivered by an actual
carrier, any notice given under this article to him shall
have the same effect as if it had been given to the carrier,
and any notice given to the carrier shall have effect as if
given to such actual carrier.
7 . Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the
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creneral nature of the loss or damage, is given in writing
o
by the carrier or actual carrier to the shipper not later
than 90 consecutive days after the occurrence of such loss
or damage or after the' delivery of the goods in accordance
with paragraph 2 of article 4, whichever is later, the fai-
lure to give such notice is prima facie evidence that the
car r i e r or the actual carrier has sustained no loss or
damage due t o the fault or neglect of the shipper, his ser-
vants or agents.
8 . For the purpose of this article, notice given to a
person acting on the carrier's or the actual carrier's be-
half, including the master or the officer in charge of the
ship, or to a person acting on the shipper's behalf is
deemed to have been given to the carrier, to the actual
carrier or to the shipper, respectively.
Article 20
Limitation of actions
1. Any action relating to carriage of goods under this
Convention is time-barred if judicial or arbitral proceed-
ings have not been instituted within a period of two years.
2. The limitation period commences on the day on which
the carrier has delivered the goods or part thereof or, in
cases where no goods have been delivered, on the last day
on which the goods should have been delivered.
3. The day on which the limitation period commences is
not included in the period.
4. The person against whom a claim is made may at any
time during the running of the limitation period extend
that period by a declaration in writing to the claimant .
This period may be further extended by another declaration
or declarations.
5. An action for indemnity by a person held liable may
be instituted even after the expiration of the limitation
period provided for in the preceding paragraphs if institu-
ted within the time allowed by the law of the State where
proceedings are instituted. However, the time allowed shall
not be less than 90 days commencing from the day when the
person instituting such action for indemnity has settled the
claim or has been served with process in the act ion against
himself.
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Article 21
Juri sdiction
1. In judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods
under this Convention the plaintiff, at his option, may
institute an action in a court which, according to the law
of the State where the court is situated, is competent and
within the jurisdiction of which is situated one of the
following places:
(a) the principal place of business or, in the absence
thereof, the habitual residence of the defendant;
or
(b) the place where the contract was made provided that
the defendant has there a place of business, branch
or agency through which the contract was made; or
(c) the port of loading or the port of discharge ; or
(d) any additional place designated for that purpose in
the contract of carriage by sea.
2. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provlslons of this
article, an action may be instituted in the courts
of any port or place in a Contracting State at
which the carrying vessel or any other vessel of
the same ownership may have been arrested in accor-
dance with applicable rules of the law of that
State and of international law. However, in such
a case, at the petition of the defendant, the
claimant must remove the action, at his choice, to
one of the jurisdictions referred to in paragraph 1
of this article for the determination of the claim,
but before such removal the defendant must furnish
security sufficient to ensure payment of any judg-
ment that may subsequently be awarded to the claim-
ant in the action.
(b) All questions relating to the sufficiency or other-
wise of the security shall be determined by the
court of the port or place of the arrest.
3. No judicial proceedings relating to carriage of
goods under this Convention may be instituted in a place not
specificed in paragraph 1 or 2 of this article. The provi-
sions of this paragraph do not constitute an obstacle to the
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juriSGlction of the Contracting States for provisional or
protective measures.
4. (a) Where an action has been instituted in a court
competent under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article or
where judgment has been delivered by such a court,
no new action may be started between the same
parties on the same grounds unless the judgment of
the court before which the first action was insti-
tuted is not enforceable in the country in which the
new proceedings are instituted;
(0) for the purpose of this article the institution of
measures with a view to obtaining enforcement of a
judgment is not to be considered as the starting of
a new action;
(c) for the purpose of this article, the removal of an
action to a different court within the same country,
or to a court in another country, in accordance
with paragraph 2 (a) of this article, is not to be
considered as the starting of a new action.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding para-
graphs, an agreement made by the parties, after a claim
under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen, which
designates the place where the claimant may institute an
action, is effective.
Article 22
Arbitration
1. Subject to the provisions of this article, parties
may provide by agreement evidenced in writing that any dis-
pute that may arise relating to carriage of goods under this
Convention shall be referred to arbitration.
2. Where a charter-party contains a provision that dis-
putes arising thereunder shall be referred to arbitration
and a bill of lading issued pursuant to the charter-party
does not contain a special annotation providing that such
provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of
lading, the carrier may not invoke such provision as against
a holder having acquired the bill of lading in good faith .
3. The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option of
the Claimant, be instituted at one of the following places:
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(a) a place in a State within whose territory is
situated :
(i) the principal place of business of the defen-
dant or, in the absence thereof, the habitual
residence of the defendant; or
(ii) the place where the contract was made, provided
that the defendant has there a place of business,
branch or agency through which the contract was
made; or
(iii) the port of loading or the port of disc~arge;
or
(b) any place designated for that purpose in the arbi-
tration clause or agreement.
4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply
the rules of this Convention.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article
are deemed to be part of every arbitration clause or agree-
ment, and any term of such clause or agreement which is
inconsistent therewith is null and void.
6 . Nothing in this article affects the validity of an
agreement relating to arbitration made by the parties after
the claim under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen.
PART VI. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
Article 23
Contractual stipulations
1. Any stipulation in a contract of carriage by sea, in
a bill of lading, or in any other document evidencing the
contract of carriage by sea is null and void to the extent
that it derogates, directly or indirectly, from the provi-
sions of this Convention. The nullity of such stipulation
does not affect the validity of the other provisions of the
contract or document of which it forms a part. A clause
assigning benefit of insurance of the goods in favour of
the carrier, or any similar clause, is null and void.
2. Notwithstanding the provlslons of paragraph I of
this article, a carrier may increase his responsibilities
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and obligations under this Convention.
3. ~~ere a bill of lading or any other document evidenc-
ing the contract of carriage by sea is issued, it must con-
tain a statement that the carriage is subject to the provi-
sions of this Convention which nullify any stipulation
derogating therefrom to the detriment of the shipper or the
consignee.
4. Where the claimant in respect of the goods has
incurred loss as a result of a stipulation which is null and
void by virtue of the present article, or as a result of the
omission of the statement referred to in paragraph 3 of this
article, the carrier must pay compensation to the extent
required in order to give the claimant compensation in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention for any
loss of or damage to the goods as well as for delay in
delivery. The carrier mus~ , in addition, pay compensation
for costs incurred by the claimant for the purpose of exer-
ci sing his right, provided that costs incurred in the action
where the foregoing provision is invoked are to be deter-
mined in accordance with the law of the State where proceed-
ings are instituted.
Article 24
General average
1. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the applica-
tion of provisions in the contract of carriage by sea or
national law regarding the adjustment of gene r a l average.
2. With the exception of article 20, the provisions of
this Convention relating to the liability of the carrier for
loss of or damage to the goods also determine whether the
consignee may refuse contribution in general average and the
liability of the carrier to indemnify the consignee in res-
pect of any such contribution made or an y salvage paid.
Article 25
Other conventions
1. This Convention does not modify the rights or duties
of the carrier , the actual carrier and their servants and
agents, provided for in international conventions or nation-
al law relating to the limitation of liability of owners of
seagoing ships .
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2. The provlslons of arLicles 21 and 22 of this Conven-
tion do not prevent the application of the mandatory provi-
sions of any other multilateral convention already in force
at the date of this Convention relating to matters dealt
with in the said articles, provided that the dispute arises
exclusively between parties having their principal place of
business in States members of such other convention.
However, this paragraph does not affect the application of
paragraph 4 of article 22 of this Convention.
3. No liability shall arise under the provisions of
this Convention for damage caused by a nuclear incident if
the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such
damage :
(a) under either the Par is Convention of 29 Jul y 1960
on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28
January 1964 or the Vienna Convention of 21 May
1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage , or
(b ) by virLue of national law governing the liability
for such damage, provided that such law is in all
respects as favourable to persons who may suffer
damage as either the Paris or Vienna Conventions.
4. No liability shall arise under the provisions of
this Convention for any loss of or damage to or delay in
delivery of luggage for which the carrier is responsible
under any international convention or national law relating
to the carriage of passengers and their luggage by sea.
5. Nothing contained in this Convention prevents a
Contracting State from applying any other international con-
vention which is already in force at the date of this Con-
vention and which applies mandatorily to contracts of
carriage of goods primarily by a mode of transport other
than transporL by sea. This provision also applies to any
subsequent rev ision or amendment of s uch international
convention.
Article 26
Unit of account
1. The unit of account referred to in article 6 of this
Convention is the Special Drawing Right as defined by the
International Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in
article 6 ~r e to be converted into the national currency of
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a State according to the value of such currency at the date
of judgment or the date agreed upon by the parties. The
value of a national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing
Right, of a Contracting State which is a member of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund is to be calculated in a manner
determined by that State.
2. Nevertheless, those States which are not members of
the International Monetary Fund and whose law does not per-
mit the application of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this
article may, at the time of signature, or at the time of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or at any
time thereafter, declare that the limits of liability pro-
vided for in this Convention to be applied in their terri-
tories shall be fixed as:
12,500 monetary units per package or other shipping
unit or 37,5 mor.etary· units per. kilogramme of gross
weight of the goods.
3. The monetary unit referred to in paragraph 2 of this
article corresponds to sixty-five and a half milligrammes of
gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. The conversion of
the amounts referred to in paragraph 2 into the national
currency is to be made according to the law of the State
concerned.
4. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of
paragraph 1 and the conversion mentioned in paragraph 3 of
this article is to be made in such a manner as to express in
the national currency of the Contracting State as far as
possible the same real value for the amounts in article 6 as
is expressed there in units of account. Contracting States
must communicate to the depositary the manner of calculation
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, or the result of
the conversion mentioned in paragraph 3 of this article, as
the case may be, at the time of signature or when depositing
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or when availing themselves of the option provi-
ded for in paragraph 2 of this article and whenever there is
a change in the manner of such calculation or in the result
of such conversion.
PART VII. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 27
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby
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designated as the depositary of this Convention.
Article 28
Signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval, accession
t +
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States
until 30 April 1979 at the Headquarters of the United
Nations, New York.
2 . This Convention is subject to ratification, accep-
tance or approval by the signatory States .
3. After 30 April 1979, this Convention will be open
for accession by all States which are not signatory States.
4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
and accession are to be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
Article 29
Reservations
No reservations may be made to this Convention.
Article 30
Entry into force
1. This Convention enters into force on the first day
of the month following the expiration of one year from the
date of deposit of the 20th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For each State which becomes a Contracting State to
this Convention after the date of the deposit of the 20th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or access-
ion, this Convention enters into force on the first day of
the month following the expiration of one year after the
deposit of the appropriate instrument on behalf of that
State.
3. Each Contracting State shall apply the prOVIsIons of
this Convention to contracts of carriage by sea concluded
on or after the date of the entry into force of this Con-
vention in respect of that State .
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Article 31
Denunciation of other conventions
1. Upon becoming a Contracting State to this Convention,
any State party to the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading
signed at Brussels on 2S August 1924 (1924 Convention) must
notify the Government of Belgium as the depositary of the
1924 Convention of its denunciation of the said Convention
with a declaration that the denunciation is to take effect
as from the date when this Convention enters into force in
respect of that State.
2. Upon the entry into force of this Convention under
paragraph 1 of article 30, the depositary of this Convention
must notify the Government of Belgium as the depositary of
the 1924 Convention of the date of such entry into force,
and of the names of the Contracting States in respect of
which the Convention has entered into force.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article
apply correspondingly in respect of States parties to the
Protocol signed on 23 February 1968 to amend the Interna-
tional Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to Bills of Lading signed at Brussels on 2S August
1924.
4. Notwithstanding article 2 of this Convention, for
the purposes of paragraph 1 of this article, a Contracting
State may, if it deems it desirable, defer the denunciation
of the 1924 Convention and of the 1924 Convention as
modified by the 1968 Protocol for a maximum period of five
years from the entry into force of this Convention. It
will then notify the Government of Belgium of its intention.
During this transitory period, it must apply to the Con-
tracting States this Convention to the exclusion of any
other one.
Article 32
Revision and amendment
1. At the request of not less than one-third of the
Contracting States to this Convention, the depositary shall
convene a conference of the Contracting States for revising
or amending it.
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
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or accession deposited after the entry into rorce of an
amendment to this Convention, is deemed to apply to the
Convention as amended.
Article 33
Revision of the limitation amounts and unit
of account or monetary unit
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of article 32, a con-
ference only for the purpose of altering the ~~ount specified
in article 6 and paragraph 2 of article 26, or of substitu-
ting either or both of the units defined in paragraphs 1 and
3 of article 26 DY other units is to be convened by the
depositary in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.
An alteration of the amounts shall be made only because of a
significant change in their real value.
2. A revision conference is to be convened by the
depositary when not less than one-fourth of the Contracting
States so request.
3. Any decision by the conference must be taken by a
two-thirds majority of the participating States. The amend-
ment is communicated by the depositary to all the Contracting
States for acceptance and to all the States signatories of
the Convention for information.
4. Any amendment adopted enters into force on the first
day of the month following one year after its acceptance by
two-thirds of the Contracting States. Acceptance is to be
effected by the deposit of a formal instrument to that
effect, with the depositary.
5. After entry into force of an amendment a Contracting
State which has accepted the amendment is entitled to apply
the Convention as amended in its relations with Contracting
States which have not within six months after the adoption
of the amendment notified the depositary that they are not
bound by the amendment.
6. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession deposited after the entry into force of an
amendment to this Convention, is deemed to apply to the
Convention as amended.
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Article 34
Denunciation
1. A Contracting State may denounce this Convention at
any time by means of a not:fication in writing addressed to
the depositary.
2. The denunciation takes effect on the first day of
the month following the expiration of one yea r af t er the
notification is received by the depositary. \fuere a longer
period is specified in the notification, the denunciation
takes effect upon the expiration of such longer period aft~r
the notification is received by the depositary.
DONE at Hamburg, this thirty-first day of March one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight, in a single
original, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have
signed the present Convention.
ANNEX II
CO~~ON UNDERSTANDING ADOPTED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
It is the common understanding that the liability of
the carrier under this Convention is based on the principle
of presumed fault or neglect. This means that, as a rule,
the burden of proof rests on the carrier but, with respect
to certain cases, the provisions of the Convention modify
this rule.
ANNEX III
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
"The United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea,
"~oting with appreciation the kind invitation of the
Federal Republic of Germany to hold the Conference in
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Hamburg,
"Being aware that the facilities placed at the disposal
of the Conference and the generous hospitality bestowed on
the participants by the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany and by the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg,
have in no small measure contributed to the success of the
Conference,
"Expresses its gratitude to the Government and people
of the Federal Republic of Germany, and
"Having adopted the Convention on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea on the rbasis of a draft Convention prepared by the
United ~ations Commission on International Trade Law at the
request of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development,
"Expresses its gratituqe to the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law and to the United ~ations
Conference on Trade and Development for their outstanding
contribution to the simplification and harmonization of the
law of the carriage of goods by sea, and
"Decides to designate the Convention adopted by the
Conference as the: 'UNITED ~ATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA, 1978', and
"Recommends that the rules embodied therein be known
as the 'HAMBURG RULES'."
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